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A TRIPARTITE BATTLE ROYAL: 
 HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD AND THE ASSERTION OF 
SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PRINCIPLES 
Sean Mulryne∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
granted a certain degree of judicial deference to the Executive’s deci-
sions concerning war, military and foreign affairs, and national secu-
rity.1  The Court, however, began to exercise a more scrutinizing ju-
dicial review over these matters in 2004, when it decided Rasul v. 
Bush,2 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,3 and Rumsfeld v. Padilla.4  A reasonable per-
ception drawn from those cases5 is that the Court, in defiance of its 
traditional deferential approach, began asserting a more proactive 
role for itself inasmuch as it sought to curtail the Executive’s unilat-
eral actions during the “war on terror.”6  This Comment addresses 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2008; B.A., Gettysburg 
College, 2003.  For all they have done for me and this Comment, respectively, I 
would like to thank Barbara and Kevin Mulryne, Sr., Kevin Mulryne, Jr., Valerie Sil-
ver, and, of course, Professor Baher Azmy and Cristina Finetti. 
 1 See infra Part III.A. 
 2 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 3 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 4 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 5 Throughout this Comment, these cases, along with Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. 
Ct. 2749 (2006), will be collectively referred to as the “war on terror” cases. 
 6 See, e.g., David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After Rasul v. 
Bush: The Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 125 
(2005).  Professor Martin writes at the outset: 
The Supreme Court struck an important blow for civil liberties and 
human rights in its trilogy of enemy combatant decisions . . . . It re-
jected the Administration’s remarkably sweeping claims to a unilateral 
power to detain anyone the executive branch pronounced an enemy 
combatant in the war on terrorism, a power assertedly beyond the ef-
fective review of any court. 
Id. at 125–26; see also Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Supreme Court’s “Enemy Combatant” Deci-
sions: Recognizing the Rights of Non-Citizens and the Rule of Law, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 409, 410 (2005) (arguing that the “war on terror” cases left unresolved 
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the disputes surrounding our nation’s three branches and their ap-
propriate spheres of authority in light of the Court’s most recent de-
cision concerning Executive power in a time of active hostilities: Ham-
dan v. Rumsfeld.7
In Hamdan, the Court struck down the Executive’s use of mili-
tary commissions to try alleged terrorist suspects at the United States 
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, thereby culminating this series 
of cases that question and ultimately rebuke, to some extent, execu-
tive power in regard to military affairs during “wartime.”8  In so do-
ing, the Court implicitly and explicitly emphasized the need for Con-
gress to assert itself in checking and balancing the Executive and its 
anti-terrorism measures.9
At its outset, this Comment assumes that our tripartite national 
government requires reasonable restraints on the Executive’s use of 
power that must be externally imposed by another branch.10  This 
Comment will argue that through Hamdan and the “war on terror” 
progeny of cases, the Court asserted a more pronounced separation-
of-powers principle to countervail the Executive’s questionable ac-
tions.11  While reserving a role for itself, the Court in Hamdan has jus-
tifiably positioned Congress into the center of the debate.12  Likewise, 
this Comment will suggest that, despite Congress’s contrary reasoning 
and initiative, the Court’s role in the “war on terror” should be pre-
served.13
Part II of this Comment will outline the factual and procedural 
background of Hamdan, followed by an account of the Court’s opin-
ions in the case.14  Part III will then briefly highlight the separation-of-
powers doctrine; the Court’s traditional deference to the Executive in 
war, military and foreign affairs, and national security; and the “war 
on terror” progeny of cases.15  Part IV will explore the heightened 
scrutiny implored by the Court in Hamdan and its implications upon 
many questions, Hafetz still acknowledges that “these decisions affirmed the impor-
tant role of the federal courts in limiting executive power in the ‘war on terrorism’”). 
 7 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 8 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to 
Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 66 (2006) (“Hamdan v. Rumsfeld is a rare Supreme 
Court rebuke to the President during armed conflict.”) (footnote omitted). 
 9 See infra Part IV.B. 
 10 See infra Justice Souter’s Hamdi dissent at note 290. 
 11 See infra Part IV.B. 
 12 See infra Part IV.B. 
 13 See infra Part V. 
 14 See infra Part II. 
 15 See infra Part III. 
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our tripartite national government.16  Thereafter, this Comment will 
explain why the Court’s decision and its invocation for congressional 
action are justified, especially in light of the “war on terror.”17  Finally, 
in Part V will briefly examine Congress’s response to Hamdan and of-
fer several criticisms of the Military Commissions Act of 2006.18
II. HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD 
A. Factual Background 
Like the other Guantanamo Bay cases, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld arose 
in the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the con-
sequent hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq.19  Following the Septem-
ber 11 attacks, Congress adopted a joint resolution known as the Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF),20 which authorized the 
President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, author-
ized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . in order to prevent 
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by 
such nations, organizations or persons.”21  Pursuant to this authoriza-
tion, U.S. Armed Forces were deployed to Afghanistan, where they 
combated the Taliban, an international terrorist organization sus-
pected of aiding al Qaeda, the international terrorist organization re-
sponsible for the September 11 attacks.22  During the subsequent bat-
tles, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, along with hundreds of others, was 
arrested by the U.S. Armed Forces and detained in the U.S. Naval 
Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.23
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a military order 
declaring that any non-citizen allegedly involved or participating in 
terrorist activities “shall, when tried, be tried by military commission 
for any and all offenses triable by military commission that such indi-
vidual is alleged to have committed, and may be punished in accor-
dance with the penalties provided under applicable law, including 
 16 See infra Part IV.A. 
 17 See infra Part IV.B. 
 18 See infra Part V. 
 19 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2760 (2006). 
 20 Authorization for Use of Military Force, 107 Pub. L. No. 40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
 21 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760 (quoting AUMF, § 2, 115 Stat. 224). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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imprisonment or death.”24  Around February 2004, military counsel 
was appointed to represent Hamdan, and, in turn, counsel filed ap-
plications seeking disclosure of the charges against Hamdan and “for 
a speedy trial pursuant to Article 10 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice [UCMJ].”25  On February 23, 2004, the legal advisor to the 
Appointing Authority for Military Commissions (“Appointing Author-
ity”) denied Hamdan’s applications, having determined that Hamdan 
was not entitled to the protections of the UCMJ.26
In response to the Appointing Authority’s denial of UCMJ pro-
tections, Hamdan attempted to challenge his detainment by filing 
habeas corpus and mandamus petitions in the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Washington.27  Thereafter, the government fi-
nally charged Hamdan with a conspiracy offense, specifically alleging 
that 
from on or about February 1996 to on or about November 24, 
2001, Hamdan willfully and knowingly joined an enterprise of 
persons who shared a common criminal purpose and conspired 
and agreed with [named members of al Qaeda] to commit the 
following offenses triable by military commissions: attacking civil-
ians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged bellig-
erent; and terrorism.28
The government also accused Hamdan of committing four “overt 
acts.”29
B. Procedural History 
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington 
transferred Hamdan’s petitions to the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.30  During this time, the Combatant Status Review 
 24 Id. (quoting Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the 
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57834 (Nov. 13, 2001)). 
 25 Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 810 (2006). 
 26 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 2761 (citation omitted) (quotations omitted). 
 29 Id.  These acts included (1) “act[ing] as Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard and 
personal driver, believ[ing] all the while bin Laden and his associates were involved 
in terrorist acts prior to and including the attacks of September 11, 2001”; (2) ar-
ranging for and actually transporting “weapons used by al Qaeda members and bin 
Laden’s bodyguards”; (3) “[driving] or accompa[nying] [O]sama bin Laden to vari-
ous al Qaida–sponsored training camps, press conferences, or lectures,” at which bin 
Laden urged terrorist acts against the United States; and (4) “receiv[ing] weapons 
training at al Qaeda-sponsored camps.”  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 30 Id. 
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Tribunal convened and determined that Hamdan’s detention at 
Guantanamo Bay was justified since he was an “enemy combatant.”31  
Nevertheless, the district court granted Hamdan’s habeas petition 
and stayed the military commission’s proceedings, concluding that: 
(1) the President’s authority to convene military commissions ex-
tends only to “offenders or offenses triable by military [commission] 
under the law of war”;32 (2) the law of war includes Geneva Conven-
tion (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;33 (3) Ham-
dan is entitled to the Geneva protections;34 and (4) the proposed 
military commissions violate the UCMJ and Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions35 because the military commissions allow for 
convictions based on evidence that the accused would never see or 
hear.36
Upon appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that: (1) the 
Geneva Conventions are not “judicially enforceable” and, two judges 
believed, would not apply to Hamdan anyway;37 (2) Ex parte Quirin38 
“foreclosed any separation-of-powers objection to the military com-
mission’s jurisdiction”;39 and (3) Hamdan’s trial by commission 
would not violate the UCMJ or “U.S. Armed Forces regulations in-
tended to implement the Geneva Conventions.”40
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
On November 7, 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States 
granted certiorari to Hamdan’s appeal41 in order to decide the nar-
row questions of “whether the military commission convened to try 
Hamdan has authority to do so, and whether Hamdan may rely on 
the Geneva Conventions in these proceedings.”42
 31 Id. at 2761.  Enemy combatant was defined as “an individual who was part of or 
supporting Taliban and al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hos-
tilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”  Id. at 2761 n.1 (citation 
omitted). 
 32 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761. 
 33 Id.; see also Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 3]. 
 34 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761–62. 
 35 See Common Article 3, supra note 33. 
 36 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762. 
 37 Id. 
 38 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 39 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 2759, 2762. 
 42 Id. at 2762. 
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With Chief Justice Roberts abstaining from the decision, a major-
ity of the Court, including Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer, held that the military commissions at Guantanamo 
Bay were not authorized and thus violated the prescribed standards 
of the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.43  Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
and Alito dissented.44
1. Detainee Treatment Act of 200545
The Court began its opinion by denying the government’s mo-
tion to dismiss the writ of certiorari.46  The government’s motion 
claimed that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) foreclosed 
the Court’s jurisdiction to hear Hamdan’s complaint.47  Relying on 
“[o]rdinary principles of statutory construction,”48 the Court found 
that the DTA did not preclude its judicial review in this case because 
there is a presumption against retroactive statutory effect and a nega-
tive inference drawn when particular language included in one statu-
tory provision is excluded from another provision in the same stat-
ute.49
2. Abstention 
The government argued that the Court’s precedent in Schlesinger 
v. Councilman50 dictated that the Court adhere to the “judge-made 
rule that civilian courts should await the final outcome of on-going 
military proceedings before entertaining an attack on those proceed-
ings.”51  In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that two comity 
considerations warrant judicial abstention: that military discipline 
and efficiency are best served by the military justice system without 
interference from civilian courts; and that civilian courts should re-
spect the congressional consideration given to servicemen through 
the establishment of military courts and appellate review procedures, 
including the Court of Military Appeals and its independent, unbi-
ased civilian judges.52  The Court concluded that neither considera-
 43 Id. at 2775, 2786, 2793. 
 44 Id. at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 2849 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
 45 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, 199 Stat. 2739. 
 46 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762. 
 47 Id. at 2763. 
 48 Id. at 2764. 
 49 Id. at 2764–66. 
 50 420 U.S. 738 (1975). 
 51 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769 (citation omitted). 
 52 Id. at 2770. 
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tion applied in the present case, because Hamdan was not a member 
of the U.S. Armed Forces, and because the military commission nei-
ther is a part of the integrated military justice system nor guarantees 
insulation from military influence.53  Moreover, the Court found that 
Ex parte Quirin provided precedent for hearing Hamdan’s case and 
for refusing to abstain from the issues at bar.54
3. Congressional Authorization for Military Commissions 
After briefly recounting the history of military commissions and 
the constitutionally assigned roles of the Executive and the Legisla-
ture in matters of war,55 the Court examined Article of War 15 (“Arti-
cle 15”) and its contemporary embodiment in Article 2156 of the 
UCMJ.57  The Court explained that the Ex parte Quirin Court “did not 
view [Article 15] as a sweeping mandate for the President to invoke 
military commissions when he deems them necessary,” but rather 
“recognized that Congress had simply preserved what power, under 
the Constitution and the common law of war, the President had had 
before 1916 to convene military commissions—with the express con-
dition that the President and those under his command comply with 
the law of war.”58  Therefore, the Court accepted Article 15, and its 
current incarnation in Article 21, as a congressional preservation of 
the use of military commissions under certain circumstances.59
Turning its attention to the AUMF, the Court concluded: 
 53 Id. at 2771. 
 54 Id. at 2772.  In relevant part: 
That course of action was warranted, [the Court] explained “[i]n view 
of the public importance of the questions raised by [the cases] and of 
the duty which rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of 
peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil lib-
erty, and because in our opinion the public interest required that we 
consider and decide those questions without any avoidable delay.” 
Id. (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942)). 
 55 Id. at 2773. 
 56 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).  Article 21 reads: 
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-
martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other 
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders 
or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by such 
military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals. 
Id.  The Court explained that Article 15 is essentially preserved in the contemporary 
Article 21.  Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774. 
 57 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774. 
 58 Id. (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28–29) (other citations omitted). 
 59 See id. 
MULRYNE_FINAL_V2 1/7/2008  6:46:53 PM 
286 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:279 
 
[W]hile we assume the AUMF activated the President’s war pow-
ers, . . . and that those powers include the authority to convene 
military commissions in appropriate circumstances, . . . there is 
nothing in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting 
that Congress intended to expand or alter the authorization set 
forth in Article 21 of the UCMJ.60
Thereafter, the Court similarly posited that the DTA “contains no 
language authorizing that tribunal or any other at Guantanamo Bay,” 
but does reserve judgment on the applicability of the Constitution 
and other U.S. laws to, and thus the constitutionality and legality of, 
the standards and procedures used in these military commissions.61  
In summary, the Court declared: 
Together, the UCMJ, the AUMF, and the DTA at most acknowl-
edge a general Presidential authority to convene military commis-
sions in circumstances where justified under the “Constitution 
and laws,” including the law of war.  Absent a more specific con-
gressional authorization, the task of this Court is, as it was in 
Quirin, to decide whether Hamdan’s military commission is so jus-
tified.62
4. Legality of Military Commissions 
Having established that Hamdan’s military commission was not 
specifically authorized by any congressional action, the Court then 
examined whether the Executive’s unauthorized use of a commission 
was appropriate in the given context.63  The Court began this evalua-
tion by identifying three historical scenarios for which military com-
missions are commonly reserved.64  Next, the Court looked to the fa-
mous work of Colonel William Winthrop to discern the four 
preconditions necessary to exercise jurisdiction by military commis-
sion over a person such as Hamdan.65  Conceding that these precon-
 60 Id. at 2775 (citations omitted). 
 61 Id. (citations omitted). 
 62 Id. at 2775. 
 63 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct.  at 2774–75. 
 64 Id. at 2775–76 (quotations omitted).  The three scenarios, identified by the 
Court, in which military commissions are invoked include: (1) at times and in places 
where martial law is declared; (2) when temporary military government occupies en-
emy territory or where civilian government is non-functional; and (3) as “‘incident to 
the conduct of war’ when there is a need ‘to seize and subject to disciplinary meas-
ures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have 
violated the law of war.’”  Id. 
 65 Id. at 2777 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957)).  The four pre-
conditions for exercising jurisdiction by military commission are that: (1) the charges 
are for “offenses committed within the field of the command of the convening com-
mander,” or in a “theatre of war”; (2) the offenses charged “must have been commit-
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ditions are embodied in the UCMJ and dictate whether military ne-
cessity justifies the use of a military commission,66 the Court deter-
mined that the use of a commission to try Hamdan for his alleged 
crimes was illegitimate and unlawful.67
To begin, the Court articulated at length the inadequacy of the 
conspiracy charge against Hamdan and the inability of a military 
commission to try such a claim.68  First, the Court doubted whether 
Hamdan’s alleged crimes satisfied Winthrop’s temporal and geo-
graphic preconditions.69  Second, the Court found that Congress did 
not definitively designate conspiracy as a war crime, nor did prece-
dent or the government’s examples suggest that conspiracy is “incor-
porated by reference” into Article 21.70  In addition, the Court clari-
fied that international law, including the Geneva and Hague 
Conventions, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and 
the laws of European countries in general, have not recognized con-
spiracy as a punishable crime in the law of war.71
In the end, the Court found the legal insufficiency of Hamdan’s 
charges emblematic of the Executive’s utilization of military commis-
sions when “military necessity” was not present.72  Thus, the Court 
held that the circumstances surrounding Hamdan and his military 
commission did not constitute a situation in which, “by any stretch of 
the historical evidence or this Court’s precedents, a military commis-
sion established by Executive Order under the authority of Article 21 
of the UCMJ may lawfully try a person and subject him to punish-
ment.”73
ted within the period of the war”; (3) the only individuals at trial must be 
“[i]ndividuals of the enemy’s army who have been guilty of illegitimate warfare or 
other offences in violation of the laws of war” and members of one’s own army “who, 
in time of war, become chargeable with crimes or offences not cognizable, or triable, 
by criminal courts or under the Articles of war”; and (4) the individuals’ alleged 
crimes must be “[v]iolations of the laws and usages of war cognizable by military tri-
bunals only” and which are “[b]reaches of military orders or regulations for which 
offenders are not legally triable by court-martial under the Articles of war.”  Id. (quo-
tations omitted). 
 66 Id.  
 67 Id. at 2777–86. 
 68 Id. at 2778–86. 
 69 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777–79. 
 70 Id. at 2779–84 (citations omitted). 
 71 Id. at 2780–81, 2784–85. 
 72 Id. at 2785 (“The charge’s shortcomings are not merely formal, but are indica-
tive of a broader inability on the Executive’s part here to satisfy the most basic pre-
condition—at least in the absence of specific congressional authorization—for estab-
lishment of military commissions: military necessity.”). 
 73 Id. at 2785–86. 
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Regarding the legality of the military commission’s standards 
and procedures, the Court first outlined the most controversial as-
pects of the commission, including: (1) the detainee, and possibly his 
counsel, may have limited—if any at all—access to certain evidence 
presented against the detainee;74 (2) the detainee may be precluded 
from attending “closed sessions”;75 (3) any evidence, including “tes-
timonial hearsay and evidence obtained through coercion” as well as 
non-sworn statements, may be fully admissible;76 and (4) any appeal 
by the detainee will be heard by a three-judge panel appointed by the 
Secretary of Defense and comprised of military officers, only one of 
which need have judicial experience.77
Upon dismissing the government’s objections and distinguishing 
In re Yamashita78 from the military commissions at issue,79 the Court 
explained that the President may promulgate some procedural rules 
for courts-martial and military commissions, but is restricted by Arti-
cle 36 of the UCMJ,80 which requires that the adopted rules not be 
“contrary to or inconsistent with” the UCMJ and that the adopted 
rules for military commissions be “uniform insofar as practicable” to 
those rules of courts-martial.81  Ultimately, the Court concluded that 
the “uniformity” requirement precluded the government from justify-
ing the military commission’s variant procedures.82  In other words, 
the President failed to prove why the procedures of courts-martial are 
impracticable and warrant deviation in the form of the military com-
mission in question.83  The Court was especially skeptical of the com-
 74 Id. 
 75 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786. 
 76 Id. at 2786–87. 
 77 Id. at 2787. 
 78 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
 79 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788–89. 
 80 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000).  Article 36 reads: 
(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, 
for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military 
commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of 
inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, 
so far as he considers them practicable, apply the principles of law and 
the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases 
in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or 
inconsistent with this chapter. 
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform 
insofar as practicable. 
Id. 
 81 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000)). 
 82 Id. at 2791. 
 83 See id. at 2792. 
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mission’s jettison of the basic and essential right of a defendant-
detainee to be present at his trial.84  As a result, the Court held that 
the standards and procedures of the military commission unjustifiably 
differed from those of a court-martial, and thus the commission vio-
lated Article 36(b).85  Thereafter, the Court summarized: 
The military commission was not born of a desire to dispense a 
more summary form of justice than is afforded by courts-martial; 
it developed, rather, as a tribunal of necessity to be employed 
when courts-martial lacked jurisdiction over either the accused or 
the subject matter.  Exigency lent the commission its legitimacy, 
but did not further justify the wholesale jettisoning of procedural 
protections. . . . Article 21 did not transform the military commis-
sion from a tribunal of true exigency into a more convenient ad-
judicatory tool.86
5. Geneva Conventions and International Law 
After rejecting the military commission’s procedures as violative 
of the UCMJ, the Court also proclaimed that the commission violates 
the Geneva Conventions.87  In reversing the D.C. Circuit’s determina-
tions that the Geneva provisions are judicially unenforceable and, al-
ternatively, inapplicable to Hamdan, the Supreme Court held that 
Hamdan’s rights under the Geneva Conventions “are, as the Gov-
ernment does not dispute, part of the law of war[,] . . . [a]nd compli-
ance with the law of war is the condition upon which the authority set 
forth in Article 21 is granted.”88  Therefore, the Court found the rele-
vant provisions of the Geneva Conventions judicially enforceable in-
sofar as they, as “part of the law of war,” were incorporated into U.S. 
law by Article 21.89  Furthermore, acknowledging the Executive’s ar-
gument that Hamdan was an alleged member of al Qaeda and that 
Geneva protections do not extend to the U.S. conflict with al 
Qaeda,90 the Court clarified that Common Article 3 “applies here 
even if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories.”91  The 
Court defended this interpretation by explaining that Common Arti-
cle 3, unlike Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, “affords 
some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 2792–93 (citation omitted). 
 87 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793. 
 88 Id. at 2794. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 2795. 
 91 Id. at 2794–95. 
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Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor 
even a nonsignatory ‘Power’ who are involved in a conflict ‘in the ter-
ritory of’ a signatory.”92
Common Article 3, the Court explained, guaranteed Hamdan a 
trial by a “regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guar-
antees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”93  
Relying on commentary94 to the Geneva Conventions and Yamashita,95 
the Court stated that the “regularly constituted court[s]” prescribed 
by the Geneva Conventions must be “ordinary military courts,” and 
that Geneva provisions “definitely exclud[e] all special tribunals” in-
cluding military commissions that do not conform to courts-martial 
or that are subject to change in mid-trial.96  Regarding the “judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peo-
ples,” the Court posited that “it must be understood to incorporate at 
least the barest of those trial protections that have been recognized 
by customary international law.”97  Citing to Article 75 of Protocol I98 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights,99 among other sources, the Court con-
cluded that these protections include a detainee’s right to be tried in 
his own presence and the right to have access to evidence against 
him.100  Therefore, the Court held that the Executive’s military com-
mission implemented to try Hamdan was unlawful insofar as it failed 
to meet these requirements.101
6. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence 
Justice Breyer’s concise concurrence, joined by Justices Kennedy, 
Souter, and Ginsburg, directly repudiated Justice Thomas’s com-
plaint that the majority’s decision would hamper the Executive’s abil-
 92 Id. at 2796. 
 93 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796 (citation omitted). 
 94 See 4 Int’l Comm. of Red Cross, Commentary: Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 21 (1958) [hereinafter Geneva Cmt.]. 
 95 327 U.S. at 44 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 96 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796–97 (quoting Geneva Cmt., supra note 94, at 340). 
 97 Id. at 2697. 
 98 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 
75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 99 Art. 14, ¶ 3(d), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 100 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797–98 (plurality opinion).  Justice Kennedy did not 
entirely agree with the majority on this point.  See infra note 109 and accompanying 
text. 
 101 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798 (majority opinion). 
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ity to combat terrorism.102  In particular, Justice Breyer emphasized 
the importance of congressional authorization and the role of Con-
gress in justifying the Executive’s exercise of powers, especially when 
an absence of immediate danger allows for consultation between the 
governmental branches.103
7. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence 
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined in part by Justices 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, acknowledged the separation-of-
powers principles implicated by the Executive’s military commis-
sions.104  In particular, Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority opin-
ion, and posited that Article 21 of the UCMJ imported Common Arti-
cle 3 into U.S. military law105 and that Article 36 required uniformity 
between military commissions and courts-martial barring any exigent 
circumstances.106  The military commission at issue, according to Jus-
tice Kennedy, exceeded these congressional limitations107 and had no 
practicable justifications for its deviations from courts-martial.108  
Finding the military commission unlawful, Justice Kennedy refrained 
from expounding upon some issues that the majority decided.109
8. Justice Scalia’s Dissent 
Joined in his dissent by Justices Thomas and Alito, Justice Scalia 
criticized the majority’s interpretations of the DTA on the grounds 
that the statute “prohibits any exercise of jurisdiction,” even by the 
Supreme Court, over the military commissions at Guantanamo, and 
that the statute “became effective as to all cases” on its date of enact-
ment.110  Justice Scalia concluded that the Court had no jurisdiction 
absent “an explicit reservation of pending cases,” since the DTA ex-
pressly and unequivocally ousted the Court’s jurisdiction over the 
present matter and precedent supports statutory jurisdiction ousting 
for cases pending at the statute’s effective date of enactment.111
 102 Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 105 Id. at 2803–04. 
 106 Id. at 2801. 
 107 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2808. 
 108 Id. at 2807. 
 109 Id. at 2809 (refraining from deciding whether the accused has a “right to be 
present at all stages of a criminal trial,” whether Article 75 of Protocol I is binding 
law, and whether Hamdan’s conspiracy charge is valid). 
 110 Id. at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 111 Id. at 2810–11. 
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Responding to the majority’s statutory interpretation of a nega-
tive inference that would enable the Court to exercise jurisdiction in 
this case,112 Justice Scalia emphasized that the DTA is clear in its ju-
risdiction stripping, and that precedent and a “negative inference in 
the opposite direction” support a “presumption against jurisdic-
tion.”113  Furthermore, Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s reliance 
upon the DTA’s legislative history as evidence of Congress’s intent for 
the Court to have jurisdiction over cases such as Hamdan’s.114  Ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, the congressional debates of the DTA repre-
sent views by both legislators who wanted to preclude the Court’s ju-
risdiction and legislators who wanted to preserve it, and that many 
statements relating to jurisdiction were “undoubtedly opportunistic 
and crafted solely for use in the briefs in this very litigation.”115  Like-
wise, the DTA’s drafting history, Justice Scalia argued, “is no more le-
gitimate or reliable an indicator of the objective meaning of a statute 
than any other form of legislative history.”116  In addition, Justice 
Scalia pointed to several other considerations that disputed the ma-
jority’s conclusions and underlying assumptions.117
Finally, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority’s refusal to ad-
here to Councilman’s precedent and to abstain from adjudicating 
these ongoing military proceedings.118  Considerations of military ne-
cessity, final review bestowed upon the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme 
Court, and “interbranch comity at the federal level”—between the 
judiciary and the military—necessitate, in Justice Scalia’s opinion, the 
Court’s abstention from interfering with the military commission at 
issue.119
 112 See Id. at 2765 (majority opinion). 
 113 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2812–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 114 Id. at 2815–17. 
 115 Id. at 2815–16. 
 116 Id. at 2817. 
 117 Id. at 2817–19.  These considerations included: (1) by exercising jurisdiction, 
the Court would retain jurisdiction over, and burden itself with, “all Guantanamo-
related habeas petitions”; (2) Guantanamo Bay is beyond U.S. sovereign “territorial 
jurisdiction”; and (3) the DTA does not eliminate but merely defers the Court’s ju-
risdiction over habeas petitions from Guantanamo Bay, insofar as the Court may still 
review the D.C. Circuit’s decisions relating to such petitions.  Id.  
 118 Id. at 2819–22. 
 119 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2821–22. 
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9. Justice Thomas’s Dissent 
To begin his dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,120 
emphasized that the Executive, namely the President, has constitu-
tional and precedential authority to direct national security and for-
eign affairs,121 and that congressional authorization is not always nec-
essary for the President to effectuate his actions.122  Nevertheless, 
Justice Thomas assumed that Congress authorized the President to 
try unlawful combatants when Congress enacted the AUMF.123
Conceding the relevancy of Winthrop’s treatise and its four cri-
teria for determining a military commission’s jurisdiction,124 Justice 
Thomas concluded that “[t]he Executive has easily satisfied these 
considerations here,” and that “[t]he plurality’s contrary conclusion 
rests upon an incomplete accounting and an unfaithful application of 
those considerations.”125  First, in Justice Thomas’s assessment, the 
Executive’s determinations that the “theater of the present conflict 
includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries where al Qaeda 
has established training camps, . . . and that the duration of that con-
flict dates back (at least) to [O]sama bin Laden’s August 1996 ‘Decla-
ration of Jihad Against the Americans,’” are justifiably supported by the 
Executive’s inherent authority126 and by extrinsic evidence.127  Next, 
Justice Thomas quickly confirmed that Hamdan is a person triable by 
military commission on account of his being “an unlawful combatant 
charged with joining and conspiring with a terrorist network dedi-
cated to flouting the laws of war.”128
Thereafter, Justice Thomas explained that the “nature of the of-
fense charged” against Hamdan survives the plurality’s arguments be-
cause: (1) such charges involving violations of the law of war need not 
 120 With the exception of several parts including this one, Justice Alito also joined 
Justice Thomas’s dissent.  Id. at 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Hereafter, unless oth-
erwise noted, all citations to Justice Thomas’s dissent will refer to parts in which Jus-
tice Alito joined. 
 121 Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Justice Alito did not join this part of Jus-
tice Thomas’s dissent.  Id. 
 122 Id. at 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654, 678 (1981)).  Justice Alito did not join.  Id. 
 123 Id. at 2824 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004); In re Yama-
shita, 327 U.S. 1, 11 (1946)).  Justice Alito did not join.  Id. 
 124 Id. at 2826.  The four criteria include: “(1) time and (2) place of the offense, 
(3) the status of the offender, and (4) the nature of the offense charged.”  Id. (cita-
tions omitted). 
 125 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2826 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 126 Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 127 Id. at 2828. 
 128 Id. at 2829. 
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be stated as specifically as common law indictments;129 (2) the actions 
of military commissions are to be upheld unless there is “clear convic-
tion that they are” unlawful;130 (3) it is inappropriate for the judiciary 
to intrude upon the Executive’s war management;131  and (4) “a flexi-
ble, evolutionary common-law system is uniquely appropriate” for the 
amorphous nature of war.132  Analyzing the specific charges against 
Hamdan, Justice Thomas first acknowledged that “membership in a 
war-criminal enterprise and conspiracy to commit war crimes” is 
chargeable before military commissions on account of the common 
law of war.133  Likewise, Justice Thomas again acknowledged that, 
based on precedent, Hamdan is chargeable with and triable before a 
military commission for conspiring and agreeing with al Qaeda to 
commit violent and terroristic acts.134  Furthermore, Justice Thomas 
posited that military necessity, which the plurality sets forth as “the 
most basic precondition . . . for establishment of military commis-
sions,” is a determination reserved to military judgment and not that 
of the courts,135 and alternatively, the jurisdiction of military commis-
sions is not dependent upon the exigency of the circumstances.136
Regarding the UCMJ, Justice Thomas declared repeatedly that 
Article 21, in and of itself, authorizes the Executive’s use of military 
commissions.137  Insofar as the majority’s interpretations of Article 36 
were concerned, Justice Thomas argued that the President alone has 
the authority and discretion to deviate the military commission’s pro-
cedures from those of civilian courts when he has deemed it “practi-
cable” to do so, and that the commission’s procedures are not “con-
trary to” the UCMJ since these procedures do not implicate any of 
the few UCMJ provisions concerning such commissions.138  In addi-
 129 Id. at 2829 (quoting In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 17 (1946)). 
 130 Id. at 2830 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942)). 
 131 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2830 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 132 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 133 Id. at 2830–31. Justice Thomas pointed to Civil War military trials as examples 
of tribunals prosecuting persons for similar charges.  Id. at 2831 n.7.   Justice Alito 
did not join this part of Justice Thomas’s dissent.  Id. at 2823. 
 134 Id. at 2834–36 (Justice Thomas pointed to World War II, the Civil War, Win-
throp’s treatise, and the actions of military tribunals in Nuremberg and several 
European nations as evidence of tribunals prosecuting persons for similar charges.) 
 135 Id. at 2838 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 136 Id. (“Traditionally, retributive justice for heinous war crimes is as much a ‘mili-
tary necessity’ as the ‘demands’ of ‘military efficiency’ touted by the plurality, and 
swift military retribution is precisely what Congress authorized the President to im-
pose on the September 11 attackers in the AUMF.”) (citations omitted). 
 137 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct.  at 2825, 2840–41, 2845. 
 138 Id. at 2840. 
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tion, Justice Thomas reconciled the procedures of Hamdan’s military 
commission with the “uniformity” requirement of Article 36(b) by 
holding that requirement as mandating uniform procedures only 
“across the separate branches of the armed services,” and not be-
tween military commissions and courts-martial as the majority 
opined.139
Turning his attention to the majority’s invocation of the Geneva 
Conventions, Justice Thomas posited that Johnson v. Eisentrager140 fore-
closes judicial enforceability of the Conventions, irrespective of Arti-
cle 21’s authorization, because the Conventions require political and 
diplomatic, and not judicial, relief.141  Moreover, Justice Thomas 
found that an alleged al Qaeda detainee is not entitled to Common 
Article 3 protection since the conflict against al Qaeda, as determined 
by the President pursuant to his inherent authority, is of an “interna-
tional character,” and Common Article 3, by its very language, applies 
only to “armed conflict not of an international character.”142  Alterna-
tively, even if Common Article 3 was judicially enforceable and appli-
cable to this issue, Hamdan’s case would still not be ripe, Justice 
Thomas argued, since Hamdan has not been subject to a trial by mili-
tary commission or, consequently, a final judgment and sentence.143  
Justice Thomas further concluded that “[i]n any event, Hamdan’s 
military commission complies with the requirements of Common Ar-
ticle 3,” because it is “regularly constituted,” is similar to those com-
missions that “have been employed throughout our history to try 
unlawful combatants for crimes against the law of war,” and affords 
“all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples.”144  Finally, referring again to the Geneva Conven-
tions’ text, Justice Thomas argued that the Third Geneva Conven-
tions do not apply to Hamdan because, as determined by the Presi-
dent pursuant to his inherent authority, al Qaeda is not a “High 
Contracting Party” as required by the Conventions in order for a 
party to fall underneath its protections.145
 139 Id. at 2842–43. 
 140 399 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 141 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2844–45 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 142 Id. at 2846 (quoting Common Article 3, supra note 33, at 3318).  Justice Alito 
did not join this part of Justice Thomas’s dissent.  Id. at 2823. 
 143 Id. at 2846–47.  Justice Alito joined this and all subsequent parts of Justice 
Thomas’s dissent.  Id. at 2823. 
 144 Id. at 2847–48 (quoting Common Article 3, supra note 33, at 3319). 
 145 Id. at 2849 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations and quotation omitted). 
MULRYNE_FINAL_V2 1/7/2008  6:46:53 PM 
296 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:279 
 
10. Justice Alito’s Dissent 
In his brief dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice 
Alito explained why the military commission at issue constituted a 
“regularly constituted court” as required by Common Article 3, and 
was therefore lawfully authorized by Article 21.146  According to Jus-
tice Alito, for a court to be “regularly constituted,” the tribunal must 
have been “appointed, set up, or established in accordance with the 
domestic law of the appointing country,” but need not be “similar in 
structure and composition to a regular military court.”147  Because the 
military commission here was promulgated by a military order and 
was to be routinely used, Justice Alito concluded that the commission 
was, in fact, “regularly constituted.”148  In addition, Justice Alito held 
that if the military commission could not satisfy the “uniformity” re-
quirement of Article 36, the commission would still be “regularly con-
stituted,” because it is the commission’s variant procedures that may 
be unlawful but not the tribunal itself.149  Likewise, Justice Alito noted 
that any “procedural improprieties that might occur in particular 
cases” are subject to appellate review.150
III.  THE ROAD TO HAMDAN:  
THE “WAR ON TERROR” CASES  
AND DIMINISHING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
Traditionally, the Court has deferred to the Executive on a 
range of issues relating to war, military and foreign affairs, and na-
tional security.151  Beginning in 2004, however, the Court granted 
writs of certiorari to hear cases concerning the Executive’s actions in 
Guantanamo Bay and its practice of indefinite detentions, which are 
among the most high-profile and contentious aspects of the global 
“war on terror.”152  For the most part, the Court’s decisions in these 
cases, culminating in Hamdan, effectively called into question the Ex-
ecutive’s authority to act free of any restraints.153
This section of the Comment will begin by briefly setting forth 
the separation-of-powers principles that underscore our tripartite na-
tional government and by highlighting some moments from the 
 146 Id. at 2849–50 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 147 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2851. 
 148 Id. at 2852. 
 149 Id. at 2852–53. 
 150 Id. at 2853–54. 
 151 See infra Part III.A. 
 152 See infra Parts III.A–C. 
 153 See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text. 
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Court’s aforementioned deferential approach to the Executive and 
the government at large during times of war and crisis.154  Thereafter, 
this section will summarize the “war on terror” cases so as to provide 
the recent context and precedent from which Hamdan has arisen.155
A. Tradition of Judicial Deference to Executive in War, Military and 
Foreign Affairs, and National Security 
Within the confines of our tripartite national government, each 
governmental branch has certain constitutionally prescribed respon-
sibilities and obligations, and certain powers at its disposal to fulfill 
those responsibilities and obligations.156  Each branch in turn asserts 
its powers as a check and balance on the other two branches to pro-
tect against the tyranny of accumulated power and to ensure that the 
three branches operate within their respective spheres of authority.157  
In the interrelated contexts of war, military and foreign affairs, and 
national security, however, the Judiciary has traditionally deferred to 
the Executive’s judgments158 so as to enable the Executive to effi-
ciently and effectively fulfill its constitutional responsibilities and ob-
ligations as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States, and of the Militia of the several States.”159  A number of 
cases and precedents speak to the self-imposed, diminished scrutiny 
of the Judiciary in these matters. 
At the outset of the Civil War, President Lincoln unilaterally sus-
pended the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to his executive war pow-
ers and proceeded to detain a U.S. citizen without any possibility of 
habeas relief.160  Sitting as a circuit judge in Ex parte Merryman,161 Chief 
 154 See infra Part III.A. 
 155 See infra Parts III.B–D. 
 156 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1 (2d ed. 
2002).  Chemerinsky writes, in relevant part: 
The Constitution creates a national government and divides power 
among three branches. . . . The division of powers among the branches 
was designed to create a system of checks and balances and lessen the 
possibility of tyrannical rule.  In general, in order for the government 
to act, at least two branches must agree. 
Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 364 (“The Supreme Court often has generally remarked that challenges 
to the conduct of foreign policy present a nonjusticiable political question. . . .  The 
challenges to foreign policy that are probably most likely to be deemed political 
questions are those directed to the constitutionality of the president’s use of the war 
powers.”). 
 159 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 160 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE:  CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 
26–60 (1998). 
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Justice Taney declared the President’s actions unconstitutional inso-
far as they exceeded the Executive’s constitutional powers and en-
croached upon those duties of Congress.162  Nevertheless, Chief Jus-
tice Taney deferred to the Executive’s strength by acknowledging the 
unenforceability of his holding since his judiciary powers “ha[d] been 
resisted by a force too strong for [him] to overcome.”163  Predictably, 
President Lincoln ignored Chief Justice Taney’s ruling, and Congress 
later authorized Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of habeas corpus.164
The Prize Cases,165 a conglomeration of Civil War–era cases, in-
volved the condemnation of four ships that violated President Lin-
coln’s self-initiated, congressionally unauthorized blockade.166  The 
Court not only legitimated the President’s unilateral action but essen-
tially deemed it a necessity by proclaiming that “the President is not 
only authorized but bound to resist force by force.”167  To allow the 
President to effectively “resist” active hostilities and insurrections, the 
Court declared that it must defer to the President’s “decisions and 
acts” and his determinations of “what degree of force the crisis de-
mands.”168  Furthermore, the Court held that if the Executive violated 
the separation-of-powers doctrine and encroached upon Congress’s 
authority, an ex post facto ratification of the Executive’s action by 
Congress would “perfectly cure the defect.”169
As the United States entered World War I, Congress enacted the 
Espionage Act of 1917, which “criminalized any speech that might in-
terfere with military recruitment and was used to suppress political 
dissent during” the war.170  Through a series of cases, the Court up-
held criminal convictions under the Espionage Act against First 
Amendment challenges.171  Affirming a conviction for defendants 
who printed and distributed documents that compared conscription 
to slavery and petitioned for a repeal of the military draft, Justice 
 161 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). 
 162 Id. at 149–50. 
 163 Id. at 153. 
 164 Steven R. Shapiro, Defending Civil Liberties in the War on Terror: The Role of the 
Courts in the War Against Terrorism: A Preliminary Assessment, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 
103, 104 (2005). 
 165 67 U.S. 635 (1863). 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 668. 
 168 Id. at 670. 
 169 Id. at 671. 
 170 Shapiro, supra note 164, at 104; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 160, at 173. 
 171 See REHNQUIST, supra note 160, at 174, 178–82. 
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Holmes in Schenck v. United States172 wrote: “[w]hen a nation is at war 
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance 
to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men 
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any consti-
tutional right.”173  Likewise, the Court sided with the government and 
continuously upheld the Espionage Act provisions against other de-
fendants who published and circulated articles and pamphlets that 
were critical of the government, the war, and the draft law, and who 
attempted to incite resistance.174
During World War II, the Court infamously upheld the constitu-
tionality of Japanese-American internment in the case of Korematsu v. 
United States,175 which followed on the heels of Hirabayashi v. United 
States and its vindication of governmentally imposed curfews for 
Japanese-Americans.176  Korematsu arose from an Executive Order is-
sued by President Roosevelt that preceded a general’s military order 
and a congressional enactment that authorized the internment.177  In 
light of this authorization, the Court deferred to the judgment of the 
military and of Congress and conceded to the exigent circumstances 
surrounding the war as proper justification for the internment of U.S. 
citizens.178
In Ex parte Quirin179 and In re Yamashita,180 the Court found per-
missible, pursuant to congressional authorization manifested in the 
Articles of War, the Executive’s use of military commissions to try en-
 172 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 173 Id. at 52. 
 174 See, e.g., United States v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921); Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Fromwerk v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 160, at 178–82. 
 175 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 176 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 177 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215–17. 
 178 Id. at 218.  The majority stated: 
[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authori-
ties and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that popula-
tion, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly 
ascertained.  We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Gov-
ernment did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour such 
persons could not be readily isolated and separately dealt with, and 
constituted a menace to the national defense and safety, which de-
manded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against 
it. 
Id. (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99) (internal quotations omitted). 
 179 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 180 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
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emy combatants.181  In Ex parte Quirin, eight German-born U.S. resi-
dents were tried for entering the United States during a period of war 
for purposes of committing hostile acts.182  They argued that the 
President’s use of military commissions was without statutory or con-
stitutional backing and, in turn, was violative of their constitutional 
rights inherent within a civil court proceeding.183  After holding that 
Congress authorized the commissions,184 the Court held that, as 
unlawful combatants, the prisoners had been charged with a crime 
against the law of war,185 and that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
did not extend to military commissions.186  Similarly, In re Yamashita, 
and its trial by military commission of a Japanese military leader, held 
that a U.S. military commander properly invoked a military commis-
sion in light of a President’s order and the Articles of War;187 that only 
the political branches may determine to what extent war crimes may 
be prosecuted prior to a declaration of peace;188 that the petitioner’s 
alleged violation was a violation of the law of war;189 and that the de-
fendant’s enemy combatant status precluded him from any of the 
protections of the Articles of War.190
Analyzing the curtailment of civil liberties in wartime, and the 
aforementioned episodes in American history, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist recognized “the reluctance of courts to decide a case against the 
government on an issue of national security during a war.”191  
Through his scholarship, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, in part, 
that a court may defer to the government—or, in his words, manifest 
“[j]udicial reluctance”—by avoiding the adjudication of “an impor-
tant constitutional question in the midst of a war,”192 or by deciding 
“an issue in favor of the government during a war, when it would not 
have done so had the decision come after the war was over.”193  These 
 181 Id. at 7, 20 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1). 
 182 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20–23. 
 183 Id. at 24. 
 184 Id. at 28–29. 
 185 Id. at 35–36. 
 186 Id. at 40. 
 187 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1946). 
 188 Id. at 13. 
 189 Id. at 17. 
 190 Id. at 19. 
 191 REHNQUIST, supra note 160, at 221. 
 192 Id. at 221–22.  As an example of the Court’s constitutional avoidance during 
wartime, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed to Hirabayashi and the Court’s narrow ad-
judication of the curfew requirement, thereby effectively avoiding any questions con-
cerning the constitutionality of the relocation program.  Id.; see also id. at 198. 
 193 Id. at 222.  To illustrate this point, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained: 
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aforementioned episodes both support Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
propositions and, as such, exemplify the traditional deference 
adopted by the Judiciary in favor of the judgments of the govern-
ment—the Executive and the Legislature—during times of war and 
crisis, and in regard to military and foreign affairs and national secu-
rity.194
B. Rasul v. Bush195
In Rasul, the Court determined “whether United States courts 
lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the deten-
tion of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostili-
ties and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.”196  
The case involved two Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens 
who were captured during hostilities between the United States and 
the Taliban, and were detained in Guantanamo Bay along with ap-
proximately 640 other non-Americans who were similarly captured.197  
In challenging their detentions, the Australian and Kuwaiti detainees 
brought separate actions seeking, among other things, to know the 
charges against them and to have access to counsel and to courts.198
Quirin, decided during the darkest days of World War II, actually cut 
back on some of the extravagant dicta favorable to civil liberty in 
Milligan.  Of the three Japanese internment cases, only Endo, decided 
near the end of World War II, represented even a minor victory for 
civil liberty.  And as for Duncan, the good news for the people of Hawaii 
was that the court held that martial law there during World War II had 
been unlawful; the bad news was that the decision came after the war 
was over, and a year and a half after martial law had been ended by 
presidential order. 
Id. at 221. 
 194 Id. at 222–23.  After recounting a number of these episodes in detail, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist observed: 
In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a proper 
balance between freedom and order.  In wartime, reason and history 
both suggest that this balance shifts to some degree in favor of order—
in favor of the government’s ability to deal with conditions that 
threaten the national well-being.  It simply cannot be said, therefore, 
that in every conflict between individual liberty and governmental au-
thority the former should prevail.  And if we feel free to criticize court 
decisions that curtail civil liberty, we must also feel free to look critically 
at decisions favorable to civil liberty. 
Id.  
 195 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 196 Id. at 470. 
 197 Id. at 470–71. 
 198 Id. at 471–72. 
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The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens and joined by 
Justices O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the fed-
eral judiciary may exercise jurisdiction to determine the legality of 
the Guantanamo Bay detainees’ detentions.199  To reach this holding, 
the Court first distinguished the present case from the facts of Eisen-
trager,200 in which the Court refused to extend the constitutional writ 
of habeas corpus and its enforceability by U.S. courts to foreign ene-
mies.201  The Court then reasoned that the holding of Braden v. 30th 
Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky202 “overruled the statutory predicate to 
Eisentrager’s holding.”203  In its place, Braden held that a prisoner need 
not be present within a district court’s territorial jurisdiction in order 
to invoke habeas proceedings, because the federal habeas corpus 
statute204 predicates its reach over the prisoner’s custodian’s presence 
within the jurisdiction and not that of the prisoner.205  Furthermore, 
the Court found that Guantanamo Bay, by virtue of the United States’ 
agreement with Cuba and its plenary control derived therefrom, is 
sovereign territory of the United States, and that federal court juris-
diction does extend there.206
C. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld207
The Court accepted the case of Hamdi “to consider the legality 
of the Government’s detention of a United States citizen on United 
States soil as an ‘enemy combatant’ and to address the process that is 
constitutionally owed to one who seeks to challenge his classification 
as such.”208  The case stemmed from the arrest and military detain-
 199 Id. at 485. 
 200 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 201 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475–76.  Written in relevant part: 
Petitioners in these cases differ from the Eisentrager detainees in impor-
tant respects: They are not nationals of countries at war with the 
United States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts 
of aggression against the United States; they have never been afforded 
access to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrong-
doing; and for more than two years they have been imprisoned in terri-
tory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and 
control. 
Id. at 476. 
 202 410 U.S. 484 (1973). 
 203 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 479. 
 204 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000). 
 205 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478–79 (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 459–500). 
 206 Id. at 480–81. 
 207 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 208 Id. at 509. 
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ment of Yaser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen born in Louisiana.209  
As a next friend, Hamdi’s father filed a habeas corpus petition, argu-
ing that, despite his son’s designation as an “enemy combatant,” 
Hamdi should not be held indefinitely without access to counsel, 
without evidentiary hearings at which he could contest factual allega-
tions, and without charges.210
Writing for the plurality, Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, found that “the 
AUMF is explicit congressional authorization,” so long as the de-
tained citizen is designated an “enemy combatant,” that satisfies the 
requirement in 18 U.S.C. Section 4001(a) that a U.S. citizen’s deten-
tion be “pursuant to an Act of Congress.”211  Therefore, the Court 
held that the detention of a U.S. citizen designated an enemy com-
batant “for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were 
captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be 
an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has au-
thorized the President to use.”212
Having established the Executive’s authority to militarily detain 
certain U.S. citizens, the Court turned its attention to what, if any, 
process those citizen-detainees are entitled to in order to challenge 
their enemy combatant status.213  Here, the Court adopted the judi-
cial-balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge,214 in which a due process 
conflict is settled by weighing “‘the private interest that will be af-
fected by the official action’ against the Government’s asserted inter-
est, ‘including the function involved’ and the burdens the Govern-
ment would face in providing greater process.”215  After balancing the 
competing interests, the Court held that a citizen-detainee challeng-
ing his enemy combatant status must receive notice of the factual ba-
sis for his classification and be granted a fair opportunity to respond 
before a neutral decision-maker.216  The Court, however, also con-
cluded that exigent circumstances may necessitate a rebuttable pre-
sumption in favor of the government and its evidence, and that the 
government’s hearsay evidence may be acceptable.217
 209 Id. at 510. 
 210 Id. at 511. 
 211 Id. at 516–17 (plurality opinion) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)). 
 212 Id. at 518 (quoting AUMF, § 2, 115 Stat. at 224). 
 213 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 524 (plurality opinion). 
 214 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 215 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
 216 Id. at 533. 
 217 Id. at 533–34. 
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To conclude, Justice O’Connor pointedly rejected the Execu-
tive’s contention that “separation of powers principles mandate a 
heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances.”218  
Justice O’Connor went on to write: 
Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any examination 
of the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the 
broader detention scheme  cannot be mandated by any reasonable 
view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only to con-
dense power into a single branch of government. . . . [A] state of 
war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the 
rights of the Nation’s citizens.219
D. Rumsfeld v. Padilla220
Padilla involved the arrest and military detention of an American 
citizen in Chicago who was accused of plotting to detonate a “dirty 
bomb” and was subsequently designated an “enemy combatant.”221  
Padilla’s counsel challenged the constitutionality of Padilla’s deten-
tion by filing a petition for habeas corpus.222  The Court granted a 
writ of certiorari to decide if “Padilla properly file[d] his habeas peti-
tion in the Southern District of New York; and second, [whether] the 
President possess[ed] authority to detain Padilla militarily.”223  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority consisting of Justices 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that the respondent 
wrongly filed his habeas petition in New York, and that he should 
have filed in the United States District Court for the District of South 
Carolina.224  The Court reasoned that the language of the federal ha-
beas statute and the immediate custodian rule of Wales v. Whitney225 
require a prisoner to challenge his or her physical confinement 
against “the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being 
held.”226  Likewise, federal district courts may only grant habeas relief 
“within their respective jurisdictions.”227
 218 Id. at 535–36. 
 219 Id. 
 220 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 221 Id. at 430–31. 
 222 Id. at 432. 
 223 Id. at 430. 
 224 Id. at 446–47. 
 225 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885). 
 226 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435. 
 227 Id. at 442 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000)). 
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IV. HAMDAN’S HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
AND A CONGRESSIONAL CALL-TO-ARMS 
Irrespective of their limitations, the previous “war on terror” 
cases were nonetheless decided in favor of the detainees, and were 
largely hailed as a rebuke to the Bush administration and its expan-
sive anti-terrorism policies.228  In accordance with these recent prece-
dents, Hamdan shares in the Court’s departure from traditionally de-
ferring to the Executive in times of war, and in regard to military and 
foreign affairs and national security.229  Hamdan, however, goes even 
further in scrutinizing the Executive’s actions.  Specifically, it creates 
military commissions to try non-citizen detainees, by essentially re-
quiring a more specific congressional authorization230 and by invoking 
international law as both applicable and enforceable to the issues at 
hand.231  Perhaps more significant than Hamdan’s non-deferential 
approach and its enforceable application of international law are the 
separation-of-powers principles that these holdings invoke.232  This 
part of the Comment will look closely at the Court’s non-deferential 
approach taken in Hamdan.233  Following that analysis will be a con-
sideration of its implications.234
A. Hamdan’s Heightened Scrutiny 
This Comment considers Hamdan’s “heightened scrutiny” to 
primarily refer to the Court’s inquiry into whether Congress offered 
specific express authorization for the Executive’s actions.  In addi-
tion, the Court arguably employed “heightened scrutiny” when it ap-
plied and enforced the Geneva Conventions against the Executive.  
Both of these prongs are analyzed in turn. 
1. Specific Congressional Authorization 
The overarching reason for Hamdan’s repudiation of the Execu-
tive’s military commission was the Court’s determination that such 
commissions lack specific congressional authorization and are thus 
unlawful.235  In fact, on no fewer than four occasions does the Court 
 228 See supra notes 6, 153 and accompanying text. 
 229 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 230 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 231 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 232 See infra Part IV.B. 
 233 See infra Part IV.A. 
 234 See infra Part IV.B. 
 235 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775, 2779, 2785 (2006); see also 
Stephen Ellmann, The “Rule of Law” and the Military Commission, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
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reference the absence of specific congressional authorization and its 
fatal consequences upon the military commissions.236  In light of Jus-
tice Jackson’s influential analysis in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer concerning the interplay between presidential powers and 
congressional pronouncements, the Court’s inquiry into whether or 
not Congress approved the Executive’s use of military commissions 
does not seem particularly unusual or revelatory.237  Such a probing 
inquiry, however, becomes more curious when contemplating the Ju-
diciary’s traditional deference to the Executive in matters of war, 
military and foreign affairs, and national security,238 and the alterna-
tive interpretations and precedents that were available to the Court.  
Contrary to its traditional deference, the Court adopted a more criti-
cal approach.  It employed a decidedly stricter scrutiny in its prece-
dential and statutory interpretations to determine the lawfulness of 
the Executive’s exercise of military power in a time of active hostilities 
and struck down the use of military commissions under the attendant 
circumstances. 
If the Court desired to adhere to the tradition of judicial defer-
ence, reasonable options would have permitted such an approach.  
Most assuredly, the Court could have relied upon Ex parte Quirin’s 
holding: 
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15 [currently embod-
ied in Article 21], Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it 
may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have juris-
diction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in ap-
propriate cases.  Congress, in addition to making rules for the 
government of our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority 
to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by sanc-
tioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of mili-
tary commissions to try persons for offenses which . . . are cogni-
761, 779–80 (2007). Explaining Hamdan’s significance as it relates to congressional 
authority, Ellmann writes: 
It seems fair to say that besides declaring that the President does not 
have a blank check, the Court is also saying that Congress needs to get 
back in the check-writing business before the courts will permit what 
otherwise appear to be breaches of human rights.  The majority Jus-
tices repeatedly make clear that the absence of statutory authorization 
is important to their finding that the commissions are illegal, and reit-
erate that what is needed is “a more specific congressional authoriza-
tion” or an “express statutory provision . . . .” 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 236 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775, 2779, 2785. 
 237 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636–38 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring). 
 238 See supra Part III.A. 
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zable by such tribunals. . . .  By his Order creating the present 
Commission [the President] has undertaken to exercise the au-
thority conferred upon him by Congress, and also such authority 
as the Constitution itself gives the Commander in Chief, to direct 
the performance of those functions which may constitutionally be 
performed by the military arm of the nation in time of war.239
A literal reading of Ex parte Quirin suggests that Supreme Court 
precedent supports the proposition that Article 21, in and of itself, 
constitutes sufficient congressional authorization for the Executive’s 
use of military commissions.240  The Court seemed to acknowledge 
this proposition when it curtly refused to accept it.241  In its stead, the 
Court recast Ex parte Quirin’s treatment of Article 15 as congressional 
preservation, not authorization, of the Executive’s power to convene 
military commissions, which may only be activated by express con-
gressional authorization.242  Thus, it seems as if Hamdan overrules Ex 
parte Quirin’s characterization of Article 21 without explicitly saying 
so.243  After Hamdan and its heightened standards, the military com-
missions espoused in Article 21 now appear to be available to the Ex-
ecutive, notwithstanding exigencies, only when expressly granted to it 
by Congress.244
Further reluctance on behalf of the Court to defer to the Execu-
tive is evident in the Court’s statutory interpretations.  Even after cast-
ing limitations upon the Executive per Article 21, the Court could 
have relied on Hamdi and its reading of the AUMF as sufficient to 
trigger the Executive’s use of military commissions.245  In Hamdi, the 
plurality opinion held that Congress’s enactment of the AUMF served 
both to activate the President’s war powers and to provide “explicit 
 239 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942). 
 240 See id. 
 241 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 (“We have no occasion to revisit Quirin’s contro-
versial characterization of Article of War 15 as congressional authorization for mili-
tary commissions.”); see also id. at 2775 n.24 (“[I]t is noteworthy that the Court in Ex 
parte Quirin . . . looked beyond Congress’s declaration of war and accompanying au-
thorization for use of force during World War II, and relied instead on Article of War 
15 to find that Congress had authorized the use of military commissions in some cir-
cumstances.”). 
 242 Id. at 2774. 
 243 See Samuel Estreicher & Diarmuid O’ Scannlain, The Limits of Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, 9 GREEN BAG 353 (2006) (“Hamdan requires the President to try Guantanamo 
detainees by court-martial proceedings or seek from Congress express authorization 
of the use of military commissions or some express alteration of court-martial proce-
dures.”). 
 244 See id. 
 245 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517–18 (2004). 
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congressional authorization for the detention of” citizen-detainees.246  
The plurality continued by emphasizing that the capture and deten-
tion of both lawful and unlawful combatants “is so fundamental and 
accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and 
appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use.”247  
Therefore, the Hamdi plurality authorized the virtually indefinite de-
tention of U.S. citizens, despite the absence of specific and unequivo-
cal language within the AUMF setting forth such express congres-
sional approval.248  Instead of requiring actual statutory words to 
mandate the detention of enemy combatants, the plurality merely 
implied congressional authorization from the AUMF’s phrase “neces-
sary and appropriate force,” in connection to other relevant cases 
and authorities.249
Though detaining an alleged enemy combatant is certainly dis-
tinguishable from trying that combatant in a military commission, the 
Hamdan Court could have interpreted the AUMF as broadly as did 
the Hamdi plurality,250 and thus could have deemed the AUMF suffi-
cient congressional authorization for the Executive’s use of such 
commissions, especially in light of Ex parte Quirin and In re Yamashita.  
Just as the AUMF satisfied the express congressional requirements of 
18 U.S.C. Section 4001(a) in Hamdi,251 the AUMF could have trig-
gered the Executive’s congressionally reserved power of 10 UCMJ sec-
tion 821 to implement military commissions.  Supporting this inter-
pretation is Ex parte Quirin, which stated: 
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of 
measures by the military command not only to repel and defeat 
the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those 
enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military ef-
fort have violated the law of war.252
The Hamdan Court, however, chose not to find the use of military 
commissions as an “incident of war” includable within Congress’s 
 246 Id. at 517. 
 247 Id. at 518 (quoting AUMF, § 2, 115 Stat. at 224). 
 248 See id. 
 249 See id. (quoting AUMF, § 2, 115 Stat. at 224). 
 250 See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text. 
 251 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517–18. 
 252 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942) (emphasis added); see also Hamdi, 542 
U.S. at 518 (“The capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, de-
tention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by ‘universal agreement and practice,’ are 
‘important incident[s] of war.’”) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28) (emphasis 
added). 
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conferral of “necessary and appropriate force” to the Executive.253  
Instead, the Court held that “there is nothing in the text or legislative 
history of the AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to expand 
or alter the authorization set forth in Article 21 of UCMJ.”254  Again, 
the Court sought and did not find a definitive congressional intent 
sufficient to condone the Executive’s action. 
Similarly, the Court interpreted the DTA narrowly and, despite 
its adoption by Congress after the Executive’s creation of the military 
commissions, found that the statute “contains no language authoriz-
ing that tribunal or any other at Guantanamo Bay.”255  The Court 
conceded that the DTA “recognize[s] the existence of Guantanamo 
Bay commissions in the weakest sense, . . . because it references some 
of the military orders governing them and creates limited judicial re-
view of their final decision[s].”256  The Court, however, also found 
that the statute reserved judgment on whether U.S. law applies to the 
commissions and whether their standards and procedures are law-
ful.257  A less deferential Court could have broadly construed Con-
gress’s adoption of the DTA as impliedly authorizing, if not acquiesc-
ing to, the Executive’s use of military commissions, especially since 
the DTA was debated and enacted in light of the commissions’ crea-
tion.258  This Court, however, carefully scrutinized the DTA as it did 
the UCMJ and the AUMF in requiring that Congress specifically and 
expressly authorize the use of military commissions before the Execu-
tive may lawfully implement such an adjudicatory system.259
This heightened scrutiny through which the Court gleaned con-
gressional consent deviates from the traditional deference the Judici-
ary associates with executive action in matters of war, military and 
foreign affairs, and national security.260  The explicit and implicit 
 253 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006). 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. (quotations omitted). 
 257 Id. 
 258 See id. at 2810–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 259 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775.  In relevant part: 
Together, the UCMJ, the AUMF, and the DTA at most acknowledge a 
general Presidential authority to convene military commissions in cir-
cumstances where justified under the “Constitution and laws,” includ-
ing the law of war.  Absent a more specific congressional authorization, 
the task of this Court is, as it was in Quirin, to decide whether Ham-
dan’s military commission is so justified. 
Id. 
 260 See supra Part III.A. 
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ramifications of this stricter approach will be discussed later in this 
Comment.261
2. Application and Enforceability of the Geneva 
Conventions and International Law 
Having struck down the Executive’s military commissions for 
their lack of specific congressional authorization and their failure to 
comply with the UCMJ, the Court had an ample opportunity to avoid 
the issue of the Geneva Conventions’ applicability and enforceability 
in the context of Guantanamo Bay detentions.262  The Court had pre-
viously postponed a similar deliberation in Hamdi.263  By requiring 
“uniformity” between the UCMJ’s courts-martial and any proposed 
military commissions, the Court already established strong standards 
and procedural protections for Hamdan and other detainees in the 
event that the Executive attempted to resurrect commissions.264  As 
such, an extension of Geneva protections was not entirely necessary 
to insulate Hamdan and other detainees from procedural abuses or 
adjudicatory insufficiencies.265  Nevertheless, the Court again evaded 
judicial deference and averred limitations upon the Executive’s uni-
lateral exercise of power by applying and enforcing the Geneva Con-
ventions to the Guantanamo Bay detainees.266  The Court held that 
the Geneva Conventions were part of the law of war, and were thus 
incorporated and mandated into U.S. military affairs via Article 21.267
In so doing, the Court reversed the deferential approach of the 
D.C. Circuit.268  The D.C. Circuit’s refusal to impose Geneva provi-
sions upon the Executive’s military commissions was grounded in a 
footnote in Johnson v. Eisentrager and the notion that the Geneva Con-
ventions are beyond judicial enforceability and may only be enforced 
by “political and military authorities.”269  That decision by the D.C. 
 261 See infra Part IV.C. 
 262 For analogy to the Court’s traditional deference, see notes 191–94 and accom-
panying text. 
 263 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 n.2 (2004) (“Because we hold that 
Hamdi is constitutionally entitled to the process described above, we need not ad-
dress at this time whether any treaty guarantees him similar access to a tribunal for a 
determination of his status.”). 
 264 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2791–93. 
 265 See id. 
 266 Id. at 2793–94. 
 267 Id. at 2794. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950)).  Recalling 
the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Hamdan: 
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Circuit, to which Chief Justice Roberts concurred as a D.C. Circuit 
judge, provided a viable alternative for a deferential court that sought 
to restrict its review of the Executive’s execution of a “war on ter-
ror.”270  This Court, however, had no such desire.271  Instead, the 
Court held that, at the very least, Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions protects Hamdan and the detainees and guarantees 
them hearings before a “regularly constituted court affording all the 
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples.”272
In setting forth what “judicial guarantees . . . are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples,” a plurality of the Court accepted 
the safeguards enumerated in Article 75 of Protocol I (“Article 75”) 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions along with the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.273  Even Justice Kennedy, who con-
curred in the majority’s opinion, questioned the Court’s citation to 
Article 75, thereby suggesting that the majority’s opinion was unnec-
essarily expansive.274  Both Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy noted 
that Article 75 was not expressly ratified by Congress, yet Justice Ste-
vens adopted it as an acceptable and enforceable standard in his 
opinion for the Court.275
In the end, the Court’s enforceable application of the Geneva 
Conventions further affirms the Court’s retreat from judicial defer-
ence to the Executive in war, military and foreign affairs, and na-
tional security.  That the Court even relied upon other international 
legal provisions beyond Common Article 3 shows the degree to which 
the Court willingly departed from the Executive’s unilateral expecta-
tions. 
We are not holding that these prisoners have no right which the mili-
tary authorities are bound to respect.  The United States, by the Ge-
neva Convention of July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, concluded with forty-
six other countries, including the German Reich, an agreement upon 
the treatment to be accorded captives.  These prisoners claim to be and 
are entitled to its protection.  It is, however, the obvious scheme of the 
Agreement that responsibility for observance and enforcement of these 
rights is upon political and military authorities.  Rights of alien enemies 
are vindicated under it only through protests and intervention of pro-
tecting powers as the rights of our citizens against foreign governments 
are vindicated only by Presidential intervention. 
Id. at 2794 (quoting Johnson, 339 U.S. at 789). 
 270 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2842–49 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 271 Id. at 2796 (majority opinion).   
 272 Id. (quoting Common Article 3, supra note 33, at 3320). 
 273 Id. at 2797, 2797 n.66 (plurality opinion). 
 274 Id. at 2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 275 Id. at 2797 (plurality opinion). 
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B. Pulling Congress into the Fray 
Underneath the substantive and procedural implications of the 
“war on terror” decisions, the Court has, both expressly and impli-
edly, invited separation-of-powers principles into the “war on terror.”  
Rasul was an assertion of judicial prerogative, albeit only proce-
durally, by extending federal judicial review into the detentions, and 
thus into the Executive’s actions, at Guantanamo Bay.276  Hamdi spoke 
with broad and vibrant language about the Court’s active role in ad-
judicating the Executive’s actions.277  Now, Hamdan’s contribution to 
the twenty-first century conception of the American tripartite gov-
ernment may be its resounding call to Congress—its invocation of 
congressional action and responsibility in a time of war and crisis by 
positioning the Legislature between the Executive and the Judiciary 
so as to resolve significant disputes.278
Some scholars note Congress’s persistent inertia and passivity in 
regard to issues of national security and worried about the abun-
dance of power defaulting unto the Executive.279  Others plead for 
Congress to re-engage itself with America’s post-September 11 condi-
tion and to clarify the legal framework that seems conflicted by the 
Executive’s unilateral actions in an amorphous global climate.280  
 276 See supra Part III.B. 
 277 542 U.S. 507, 535–36 (2004). 
 278 See Ellmann, supra note 235, at 780 (“[I]n Hamdan, the Supreme Court has ap-
plied the ultimate enforcement weapon—it has barred particular Executive action at 
least so long as Congress fails to affirmatively endorse it.”). 
 279 See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congress, Civil Liberties, and the War on Terrorism, 11 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1139, 1145–46 (2003).  Professor Devins writes, in relevant part: 
Against the backdrop of Congress’s declining role in war-making and 
the diminished status of civil liberties during wartime, it is little wonder 
that (1) the Bush administration has been the moving force in initiat-
ing war on terror-related limitations on civil liberties, (2) Congress has 
largely facilitated presidential dominion of the war on terror by approv-
ing most provisions of legislation introduced by the White House and 
generally standing on the sidelines when the President claimed that the 
Constitution or existing law supported one or another initiative, and 
(3) the public has backed most war-time limitations on civil liberties 
(especially those of noncitizens). 
Id. 
 280 See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, The Constitution in Crisis Times, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. 
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 11, 19–20 (2003) (arguing that Congress has a constitutional role 
to play in our nation’s foreign affairs and national security).  Professor Rakove writes, 
in relevant part: 
Rather than rely on a broad and indefinite notion of inherent execu-
tive power, mystically compressed in the first sentence of Article II, 
constitutionalists today, as then, would want Congress to assert its re-
sponsibility as well as its power over an array of national security issues. 
. . . If [military commissions are] the most appropriate way to deal with 
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Perhaps most notably, John Hart Ely, years before the tragedies of 
September 11, advocated for a judicial review that would rein in the 
Executive’s unilateral initiation of a war by declaring it unconstitu-
tional in the absence of congressional authorization.281  In turn, Ely 
posited, the Judiciary would “remand” the issue to Congress, thereby 
forcing the Legislature to discharge its constitutional duties.282  Essen-
tially, the Court’s decision agrees with these assertions, and thus 
serves as a formal invitation for Congress to enter the fray. 
A reasonable, if not necessary, inference deriving from Hamdan’s 
unrelenting heightened scrutiny is that the Court intended to impli-
cate Congress into legitimizing or condemning the Executive’s mili-
tary commissions by requiring Congress to clarify its intent with pre-
cise language henceforth.283  This contention is more evident when 
juxtaposing Hamdan and Hamdi.  Contrary to Hamdi, the Court in 
Hamdan required specific congressional authorization to enable the 
Executive to achieve its goals,284 even in light of precedent favorable 
to the Executive’s position.285  Likewise, the Hamdan Court, unlike 
Hamdi, would not accept anything less than express and unequivocal 
congressional authorization in allowing a recent piece of legislation 
to satisfy the provisions of a federal statute.286  Such distinctions not 
only serve to differentiate Hamdan and Hamdi’s plurality opinion, but 
also illustrate the similarities between Hamdan and Hamdi’s dissents.  
Notwithstanding their specific concerns for citizen-detainees, the 
Hamdi dissents are precursors to Hamdan’s heightened scrutiny and 
its mandate for congressional clarity. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, argued adamantly that 
the detention of a U.S. citizen without the possibility of habeas cor-
the unusual prisoners, such a struggle will produce, so be it.  But let the 
sanctioning of this departure from conventional legal norms enjoy a 
higher measure of legality than past precedent and presidential fiat can 
provide. 
     . . . Congress should step up to the plate, recognizing that the pro-
tection of the national security is no less its duty and responsibility than 
it is that of the president. 
Id. 
 281 JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM 
AND ITS AFTERMATH 54 (1993) [ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY]. 
 282 See id. 
 283 Ellmann, supra note 235, at 780 (By requiring “more specific congressional au-
thorization . . . [the Court] is also trying to impel Congress to take a responsibility 
that Congress itself had not, at least not specifically, chosen to meet.”). 
 284 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 285 See supra Part II.C.9. (discussing Justice Thomas’s Hamdan dissent); see also su-
pra notes 239–44 and accompanying text. 
 286 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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pus requires specific congressional authorization in the form of a 
constitutional suspension of the writ.287  Alternatively, Justice Scalia 
contended that the AUMF does not provide congressional consent 
with requisite specificity to justify a U.S. citizen’s detention.288
Likewise, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented 
from the plurality’s decision by requiring clear and unequivocal con-
gressional authorization to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), thereby war-
ranting the indefinite detainment of a U.S. citizen, and that such au-
thorization is lacking when the Executive’s only “factual justification . 
. . is a war on terrorism.”289  Pointing to his third reason for necessitat-
ing specific congressional authorization, Justice Souter reiterated the 
logic of a tripartite government during times of war: 
The defining character of American constitutional government is 
its constant tension between security and liberty, serving both by 
partial helpings of each.  In a government of separated powers, 
deciding finally on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed lib-
erty whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is 
not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose 
particular responsibility is to maintain security.  For reasons of in-
escapable human nature, the branch of the Government asked to 
counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest the Na-
tion’s entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to 
win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory; the responsibility 
for security will naturally amplify the claim that security legiti-
mately raises.290
Justice Souter thereby justified the need for “a clear statement of 
[congressional] authorization” when stating: “[a] reasonable balance 
is more likely to be reached on the judgment of a different branch . . 
. . Hence the need for an assessment by Congress before citizens are 
subject to lockup, and likewise the need for a clearly expressed con-
gressional resolution of the competing claims.”291
 287 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 573 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 288 Id.  Justice Scalia writes, in relevant part: 
Contrary to the plurality’s view, I do not think this statute even author-
izes detention of a citizen with the clarity necessary to satisfy the inter-
pretive canon that statutes should be construed so as to avoid grave 
constitutional concerns[;] . . . with the clarity necessary to comport 
with [Supreme Court precedent]; or with the clarity necessary to over-
come the statutory prescription [of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)]. 
Id. at 574 (citations omitted). 
 289 Id. at 542–45 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 290 Id. at 545. 
 291 Id. 
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The commonality shared by these four justices through these 
two dissents is that, under the attendant circumstances, the Execu-
tive’s actions are unilateral and unlawful unless Congress, in one 
manner or another, authorizes those actions with definitive, unambi-
guous consent.  This requirement was not relegated to a dissenting 
opinion in Hamdan but, rather, is the implicit bedrock of the major-
ity’s opinion.292  Therefore, the Court’s message rings clearly in its 
holding: If the Executive wants military commissions, the Executive 
must convince Congress and receive the unequivocal endorsement of 
a second branch of the American tripartite government. 
In case these implications remained cryptically buried or mis-
construed within the majority opinion, Hamdan’s concurrences ex-
pressly invite Congress to assert itself in the matter of Guantanamo 
Bay and its role within the tripartite national government.293  Justice 
Breyer, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, dedicated 
the entirety of his short concurring opinion to the importance of 
such: 
The Court’s conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground: 
Congress has not issued the Executive a “blank check.” . . . Noth-
ing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the au-
thority he believes necessary.   
     Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Con-
gress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our 
Nation’s ability to deal with danger.  To the contrary, that insis-
tence strengthens the Nation’s ability to determine—through 
democratic means—how best to do so.  The Constitution places 
its faith in those democratic means.  Our Court today simply does 
the same.294
C. Justifications for Hamdan’s Congressional Invocation 
As radical as Hamdan may seem to its critics, the Court’s decision 
is a moderate, albeit vigorous and important, assertion entirely 
grounded within the classic separation-of-powers principles that in-
form our tripartite national government.  Though the Court ada-
mantly struck down the Executive’s military commissions, it refrained 
from the sort of decision-making that is often characterized as “judi-
cial activism.”295  Instead, the Court expressly and impliedly shifted 
 292 See supra Part II.C.3. 
 293 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 294 Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 295 “A philosophy of judicial decision-making whereby judges allow their personal 
views about public policy, among other factors, to guide their decisions, usu[ally] 
with the suggestion that adherents of this philosophy tend to find constitutional vio-
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the ultimate fate of those commissions to Congress.296  In so doing, 
the Court not only sustained its involvement in contemporary af-
fairs,297 but it also firmly implanted Congress onto the battlefields of 
the “war on terror.”298  Whatever may be the wisdom of the legislative 
response to Hamdan, the Court rightfully forced Congress to respond 
and to be proactive, or—at the very least—forced Congress to take a 
definitive and unequivocal stand on the issue of military commissions 
and their entailments.299  Justifications for the Court’s non-deferential 
approach and its insistence upon congressional action are rooted in 
Congress’s unique role and capabilities within the American govern-
ment and the unusual circumstances that comprise the “war on ter-
ror.”300
Of course, in justifying the Court’s heightened scrutiny and its 
congressional invocation, it bears repeating that this Comment as-
sumes the veracity of an underlying premise.  That premise, as men-
tioned by Justice Souter, is that the Executive is ill-equipped in strik-
ing a reasonable balance between national security and individual 
liberties.301  Hence, the Executive’s scope of power must be confined 
within reason, and while the Judiciary can prevent the Executive from 
unilaterally overextending, the Legislature is ultimately the proper 
branch to define those limitations.302  Because the Executive’s actions 
must be held in check and Congress had taken no authoritative 
stance, the Court was right to uncharacteristically intrude upon the 
Executive’s actions in Hamdan, as the Court has done generally in the 
“war on terror” cases.303  The Court’s reasoning in Hamdan is justifi-
able because it implicates Congress into a more active role.304
1. Congress’s Constitutional Role 
Hamdan’s decision and its call-to-arms to Congress are justified, 
first and foremost, by the Constitution and its prescribed role to 
Congress in matters of war, military and foreign affairs, and national 
security.  The Constitution specifically mandates a number of such 
lations and are willing to ignore precedent.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (8th ed. 
2004). 
 296 See supra Part IV.B. 
 297 See infra Part V.A. 
 298 See supra Part IV.B. 
 299 See supra Part IV.B. 
 300 See infra Parts IV.C.1–3. 
 301 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 302 See infra Parts IV.C.1–3. 
 303 See supra Parts III.B–D. 
 304 See infra Parts IV.C.1–3. 
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obligations and responsibilities into the hands of Congress, including 
the enumerated powers to “provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States,”305 to create and punish interna-
tional crimes and “Offenses against the Law of Nations,”306 to declare 
war and promulgate laws regarding capture,307 to create and maintain 
armies and a navy,308 to promulgate laws for the government and the 
armed forces,309 and to call forth state militias and to govern them 
into action.310  By delegating a number of these awesome—and po-
tentially devastating—powers to Congress, the Constitution bifurcates 
the initiation and execution of war and other military operations be-
tween two branches, thereby minimizing the possibilities for misuse 
or abuse.311  Therefore, the Court’s heightened scrutiny and its ex-
hortation for congressional action is vindicated through the Constitu-
tion’s design. 
2. Institutional Competence and the “War on Terror” 
For matters steeped in policy and opposing views, Congress, on 
account of its institutional competence, has superior decision-making 
capabilities in comparison to the Judiciary.312  In other words, when 
deliberating an issue, Congress, unlike the Judiciary, may regularly 
hold hearings and engage in adversarial debates; entertain the testi-
mony of experts, practitioners, and other luminaries within respective 
fields; and sanction and publish reports, among other things.313  Re-
 305 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 306 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 307 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 308 Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13. 
 309 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 310 Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16. 
 311 See Louis Fisher, Point/Counterpoint: Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1637, 1637 (2000) (“With studied care and deliberation, the Framers of the 
Constitution created a structure to prevent presidential wars. . . .  Making fundamen-
tal judgments about representative government, popular control, and human nature, 
they placed the power of war and peace with the legislative branch and divided for-
eign policy between the President and Congress.”); id. at 1645 (“The Framers delib-
erately divided government by making the President the commander-in-chief and 
reserving to Congress the power to finance military expeditions.  The Framers re-
jected a government in which a single branch could both make war and fund it.”). 
 312 See, e.g., Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982) (“[R]elevant policy 
considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and there is vehement dis-
agreement over the validity of the assumptions underlying many of them.  The very 
difficulty of these policy considerations, and Congress’s superior institutional compe-
tence to pursue this debate, suggest that legislative not judicial solutions are prefer-
able.”). 
 313 See, e.g., John Yoo, Enemy Combatants and the Problem of Judicial Competence, in 
TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE ENEMY 
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quiring specific congressional authorization, and refusing to inter-
pretatively imply legislative consent where it may or may not exist, is 
one manner in which the Court both respects Congress’s institutional 
competence and also ensures that no lone branch is overreaching its 
authority without the blessings of another.314  Hamdan’s refusal to de-
fer to the Executive, its unclear statutory support for military commis-
sions, and solicitation for further congressional action, are justified by 
Congress’s institutional competence, and especially its practical rele-
vance as it relates to the “war on terror” and the nature of terrorism 
in general. 
The so-called “war on terror,” and its ongoing hostilities between 
the U.S. Armed Forces and terrorist organizations and individuals, is 
at best a vague and nebulous encapsulation of the unique present-day 
armed conflicts in which the United States is engaged.  Its indefinite 
and ill-defined features are in stark contrast to those of traditional 
warfare.315  Justice Souter alluded abstractly to this distinction be-
tween terrorism and traditional armed conflict when he wrote: “In a 
government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a rea-
sonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some 
condition in between) is not well entrusted to the Executive branch of 
Government . . . .”316
The differences between combating terrorism and recognizable 
enemies in traditional warfare are significant.  For example, the “war 
on terror” will likely endure for an indefinite duration because, 
unlike traditional warfare that is predicated upon battles between na-
tions and in accordance to the law of war and certain historical ex-
pectations,317 terrorism continuously thrives from often indistinguish-
COMBATANT CASES 69, 91 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005) [hereinafter Yoo, Enemy Com-
batants] (“Congress can collect information itself or acquire it from the executive 
branch or outside groups via relatively inexpensive hearings.  Courts, however, can-
not proactively collect information on a question before them.”). 
 314 See supra Part IV.B. 
 315 Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 n.13 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The United States 
confronts an untraditional war that presents unique challenges in identifying a nebu-
lous enemy.  In earlier times when the United States was at war, discerning ‘the en-
emy’ was far easier than today.”). 
 316 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
 317 Rakove, supra note 280, at 11.  Rakove writes, in relevant part: 
War, as conventionally understood, involves either conflicts between 
nation states, or between insurgencies aspiring to become nation states 
and the existing politics that dominate them.  Such conflicts have finite 
beginnings and endings, through the surrender or dispersal of one 
side’s armed forces, the occupation of its territory, the collapse of its 
governing institutions, or the negotiation of a peace. 
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able or unrecognizable transnational collectives inspired to violence 
by any number of social, economic, religious, or political indigni-
ties.318  Because terrorists are often decentralized and have no alle-
giance to any nationalistic entities, terrorism itself offers little oppor-
tunity for finite endings, whether through truce, compromise, or 
absolute domination and surrender of the enemy.319  Likewise, terror-
ism presents both a domestic and an international threat.320  Terror-
ists may be foreign fighters rampaging on the battlefields of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, or they may be U.S. citizens infiltrating and wreaking 
havoc upon the American homeland.321
As a whole, the peculiarities of terrorism render Congress the 
most appropriate branch to effectuate a response and to govern the 
Executive’s actions.  Congress’s institutional competence enables it to 
more thoroughly evaluate and weigh the competing, multi-faceted 
concerns and ramifications of terrorism, and to articulate a compre-
hensive course of action.  Upon its choosing, Congress has the means 
to return to an issue again and again if it finds circumstances necessi-
tate an altered approach.  Certainly, the unprecedented and unpre-
dictable nature of terrorism may be such a circumstance. 
On the contrary, the Judiciary is not a policy-making body but is 
the arbiter of laws.322  Consequently, the Judiciary’s review of terror-
ism cases depends upon the particularities of facts and the wisdom 
Id. 
 318 Id.  Again, in relevant part: 
Terrorism on a massive scale has become, in effect, a condition that ar-
guably will persist as far as we can see.  This condition rests upon the 
capacity of a small number of ideologically committed individuals to 
exploit the horrifying wonders of technology in order to threaten the 
security of modern society. . . . [I]t depends solely upon the probability 
that small bands of fanatics could always wreak havoc on open societies 
that can never adequately defend their multiple points of vulnerability. 
Id.  
 319 Id. at 12.  (“Terrorism’s shadowy nature enables its agents to lie dormant and 
undetected for prolonged periods.  Terrorism lacks a home territory to protect, or-
ganized armed forces to disperse, and political authority to dislodge. . . .  One nego-
tiates with enemies, but rarely, if ever, with terrorists.”). 
 320 See Yoo, Enemy Combatants, supra note 313, at 72 (“In previous modern Ameri-
can conflicts, hostilities were limited to a foreign battlefield, while the U.S. home 
front remained safe behind the distances of two oceans.  In this conflict, however, 
the battlefield can occur anywhere, and there can be no strict division between the 
front and home.”). 
 321 See id. 
 322 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  “It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.  Those who apply 
the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.  If two 
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”  Id.   
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and constraints of judicial precedent.323  By nature, courts are more 
restricted in their opportunities and capabilities to examine terrorism 
and its manifestations,324 and as a result judicial decisions may have 
unintended or tragic effects unless Congress intercedes. 
For instance, the Hamdi Court acknowledged the plaintiff’s con-
cerns about potentially indefinite detainment.325  Relying on “long-
standing law-of-war principles,” Justice O’Connor explained that 
Hamdi’s detention could only endure “for the duration of the rele-
vant conflict,” specifically the active hostilities in Afghanistan.326  Jus-
tice O’Connor, however, qualified that conclusion by stating: “If the 
practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of 
the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that 
understanding may unravel.  But that is not the situation we face as of 
this date.”327  This flexible approach, while commendable, arguably 
reaches a wrong conclusion.  The “practical circumstances” of the 
“war on terror” do seem unlike previous conflicts.328  For those rea-
sons, the hostilities in Afghanistan will conceivably endure until ter-
rorists and insurgents—Taliban, al Qaeda, and others—no longer 
roam the country, or arguably the Middle East.329  In other words, the 
“relevant conflict” in Afghanistan could persist for far longer than 
 323 John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 809 
(2004) [Yoo, War, Responsibility] (“[C]ourts work best at interpreting formal sources 
of law and applying the law to facts that are easily gathered and understood in the 
context of a bipolar dispute.  They do less well the more a dispute becomes polycen-
tric, in that it involves more actors, more sources of law, and complicated social, eco-
nomic, and political relationships.”); see also Yoo, Enemy Combtants, supra note 313, at 
99.  In describing the Judiciary’s deficiencies in handling foreign affairs and national 
security, Yoo writes: 
[The Judiciary’s] evenhandedness and passivity create problems in 
gathering and processing information effectively and in coordinating 
its policies with other national actors.  Its procedural fairness and geo-
graphic decentralization prevent it from acting swiftly in a unified fash-
ion, and it lacks effective tools for the rapid assimilation of feedback 
and the correction of errors. 
Id.  
 324 Yoo, War, Responsibility, supra note 323, at 809. 
 325 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519–20 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 326 Id. at 521. 
 327 Id. 
 328 See supra notes 317–21 and accompanying text. 
 329 Recognizing the differences between previous conflicts and the “war on ter-
ror,” Steven R. Shapiro, the National Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union, acknowledged “the need for closer judicial and political scrutiny” on account 
of the belief that “[w]e do not have the luxury, therefore, of regarding any restric-
tions on liberty as temporary expedients, like wartime rationing.  Instead, such re-
strictions must be regarded as potentially permanent transformations in America’s 
constitutional value system.”  Shapiro, supra note 164, at 116. 
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any other U.S. armed conflict in history, and in the meantime, de-
tainees like Hamdi could remain captive.330
This scenario alone serves to highlight the ongoing need for 
congressional intervention to help define the parameters of the “war 
on terror.”  Whereas the Court is confined to specific, isolated cir-
cumstances as in Hamdi and Hamdan, Congress can repeatedly evalu-
ate the amorphous nature of terrorism and the U.S. response in 
broader swaths.331  Therefore, Congress’s overview and its unique in-
stitutional competence, when coupled with its constitutional author-
ity, render Congress the more capable decision-maker to evaluate the 
“war on terror” and to provide clarity and balance to the Executive’s 
programs. 
3. Transparency 
Finally, Congress’s special relationship to the American people 
also justifies the Court’s decision to rely on, if not force, congres-
sional intervention in matters of Guantanamo Bay and terrorism.  
Legislators must often answer directly to their constituents and the 
public at large, and are thus accountable to the nation’s citizenry in a 
way the Judiciary is not.332  As such, legislators’ actions are informed 
and tempered, to some extent, by citizens’ concerns. 333  In this sense, 
along with the Executive and the Judiciary, the American people also 
serve as a check and balance on the Legislature.334  Justice Scalia likely 
had this in mind when he wrote in his Hamdi dissent: “If civil rights 
are to be curtailed during wartime, it must be done openly and de-
mocratically, as the Constitution requires, rather than by silent ero-
sion through an opinion of this Court.”335  Justice Scalia’s dissent, in 
essence, begs for the transparency of decision-making that accompa-
nies a representative democracy.336
 330 See id. 
 331 See supra note 313 and accompanying note text. 
 332 See ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 281, at 4. 
 333 See id. (“Given the way the burdens of war get distributed, it was felt that the 
people’s representatives should have a say.  It was felt further that the involvement of 
‘the people’s representatives’ would increase the participation of the people them-
selves in the debate.”) (parentheses omitted). 
 334 See id. 
 335 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 578 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 336 See id. 
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V.  SIGNING OVER THE “BLANK CHECK”:  
CONGRESS’S RESPONSE TO HAMDAN 
Shortly after the Court concluded its 2005–2006 term with the 
Hamdan decision, Congress heeded the Court’s insistence for con-
gressional action and adopted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
(“Act”).337  Initial reactions to the Act suggest that Congress handed 
to the Executive virtually all powers that the Executive originally as-
serted and subsequently sought.338  Particularly interesting and rele-
vant to this Comment, and the separation-of-powers doctrine in gen-
eral, were the Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions339 and its 
interpretational discretion assigned to the President.340  This brief 
 337 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
 338 For instance, soon after the bill was passed by Congress and was awaiting Presi-
dent Bush’s approval, a New York Times news analysis characterized the pending Act 
as follows: 
Rather than reining in the formidable presidential powers Mr. Bush 
and Vice President Dick Cheney have asserted since Sept. 11, 2001, the 
law gives some of those powers a solid statutory foundation. . . . Taken 
as a whole, the law will give the president more power over terrorism 
suspects than he had before the Supreme Court decision this summer 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld . . . . 
Scott Shane & Adam Liptak, Shifting Power to a President: Bill Creates Legal Basis for Pol-
icy on Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at A1. 
 339 Military Commissions Act § 7.  Altering the DTA, the Military Commissions Act 
reads, in pertinent part: 
(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or con-
sider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of 
an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the 
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant 
or is awaiting such determination. 
(2) [N]o court, justice, or judge shall have the jurisdiction to hear or 
consider any other action against the United States or its agents relat-
ing to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or condi-
tions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United 
States and has been determined by the United States to have been 
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determi-
nation. 
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to 
all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, 
treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the 
United States since September 11, 2001. 
Id. 
 340 Id. § 6.  The Military Commissions Act reads, in pertinent part: 
(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS.— 
(3) INTERPRETATION BY THE PRESIDENT.— 
(A) As provided by the Constitution and by this section, the President 
has the authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and 
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part of the Comment explains that the Act and Congress’s actions are 
injustices to the Court as it stands in the “war on terror.” 
A. Respecting the Court’s Self-Perceived Role 
By stripping the Court of any judicial review over Guantanamo 
Bay, Congress blatantly disregarded the Court’s recent role and its 
contributions to the rule of law for all persons within the dominion of 
the United States.  As evinced by the “war on terror” progeny of cases, 
the Court envisioned itself as having a vital role in determining the 
legality of the Executive’s actions and curtailing a potential, if not ac-
tuated, abuse of power.341
This observation is most evident in the Rasul decision, in which 
the Court empowered the Judiciary to peek into the Executive’s uni-
lateral actions in Guantanamo Bay.342  In this sense, Rasul is the em-
bodiment of the Court’s jurisprudential view of its contemporary 
role.343  Thereafter, Hamdi was more pronounced and articulate in its 
insistence for judicial involvement.344  Upon proclaiming “a state of 
war is not a blank check for the President,”345 Justice O’Connor set 
forth a reminder: “Whatever the power the United States Constitu-
tion envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or 
with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions 
application of the Geneva Conventions and to promulgate higher 
standards and administrative regulations for violations of treaty obliga-
tions which are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
(B) The President shall issue interpretations described by subpara-
graph (A) by Executive Order published in the Federal Register. 
(C) Any Executive Order published under this paragraph shall be au-
thoritative (except as to grave breaches of common Article 3) as a mat-
ter of United States law, in the same manner as other administrative 
regulations. 
(D) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the constitu-
tional functions and responsibilities of Congress and the judicial 
branch of the United States. 
Id. 
 341 Shapiro, supra note 164, at 115 (“[I]t seems increasingly clear that the courts in 
this country are less willing today than they have been in the past to retreat to the 
sidelines whenever the government raises a national security claim, regardless of its 
impact on individual rights.  That attitude is apparent in Hamdi and Rasul . . . .”). 
 342 Id. at 108 (“Rasul now stands as a strong affirmation of the judiciary’s role as 
the ultimate safeguard against arbitrary detention, in wartime as well as peacetime, 
for aliens as well as citizens.”). 
 343 See id. 
 344 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–36 (2004). 
 345 Id. at 536. 
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a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”346  Finally, 
in Hamdan, the Court, reprising its Rasul approach, narrowly inter-
preted a potentially jurisdiction-stripping DTA, meanwhile sidestep-
ping precedential obstacles, as to enable the Court to adjudicate the 
legality of the Executive’s unilateral actions, i.e., military commis-
sions.347
Given the tradition of judicial deference,348 the Court could have 
reasonably foreclosed its review of matters relating to Guantanamo 
Bay and the “war on terror.”349  In this unorthodox moment of his-
tory, however, the Court rightfully perceived itself as a necessary par-
ticipant in balancing the powers of the tripartite national government 
and guaranteeing an adequate application of law.350 Congress’s re-
sponse to the Court’s solicitation for congressional action in Hamdan, 
effectively stymieing judicial involvement, is disrespectful toward the 
Court’s self-perceived role in contemporary affairs.351  Whereas Con-
gress could have simply legitimized the Executive’s actions and left 
any remaining questions determinable by the Judiciary, Congress ef-
fectively stilted the separation-of-powers principles by essentially 
eliminating one branch of government, against the better judgment 
exercised by that very branch.352
B. The Court as Protector of Individual Rights 
Though the Court’s self-perception, in and of itself, warrants at 
least some congressional acknowledgement, other considerations cast 
doubt upon the wisdom of the Military Commissions Act.  Most nota-
bly, the Court’s “war on terror” decisions have, in essence, positioned 
the Court as a protector of individual rights and, in turn, as a polariz-
ing opponent to the Executive’s unilateral actions.353  These practical 
 346 Id. (emphasis added).  The plurality opinion then cited to Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“[I]t was the ‘central judgment of the Framers of the 
Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental pow-
ers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.’”). 
 347 See supra Part II.B.1.; see also notes 255–59 and accompanying text. 
 348 See supra Part III.A. 
 349 See, e.g., supra Part IV.A.1. 
 350 See supra note 290 and accompanying text. 
 351 See Shane & Liptak, supra note 338, at A11 (“Over all, the [Military Commis-
sions Act] reallocates power among the three branches of government, taking au-
thority away from the judiciary and handing it to the president.”).  In the same arti-
cle, Professor Bruce Ackerman warned: “If Congress can strip courts of jurisdiction 
over cases because it fears their outcome, judicial independence is threatened.”  Id. 
 352 See id. 
 353 Ellmann, supra note 235, at 788.  For example, Ellmann writes: 
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effects of the Court’s recent jurisprudence justify a congressional 
embrace of the Court’s persistent role for purposes of guaranteeing 
liberty to all persons and for ensuring informed legislative involve-
ment.354
John Hart Ely expounded an analogous theory of the Court’s as-
sumed role.355  Relying upon the famous Carolene Products Co. foot-
note,356 Ely set forth the vision of a “participation-oriented, represen-
tative-reinforcing approach to judicial review”357 that would see the 
Judiciary intervene and constitutionally adjudicate in an effort to rec-
tify any procedural “malfunction” within our representative democ-
racy.358  Ely concluded that this judicial review would seek to correct 
the procedural and participatory shortcomings in our government’s 
decision-making—and not the substantive decisions themselves—that 
burden minorities.359
It is hard not to think that in turning to the principles of the rule of 
law, the Supreme Court’s majority in Hamdan was moving towards a 
rights-minded use of the rules of statutory interpretation, and doing so 
out of a sense that in our conduct of the war against terrorism we may 
have lost our constitutional bearings and fallen far short of what a fun-
damentally decent constitutional order requires.  The Court clearly 
hoped that Congress, pressed back into engagement, would vindicate 
its faith in democracy—but the case also reflects, I think, the Court’s 
fear that of the three branches of government, perhaps it alone was 
then committed to adhering to the Constitution and laws in the midst 
of war. 
Id. 
 354 See id. 
 355 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77 
(1980) [ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST]. 
 356 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  Foot-
note four reads, in relevant part:  “[W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation 
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and 
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
 357 ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 355, at 87. 
 358 See id. at 103.  Ely describes a “malfunction” as occurring when: 
[T]he process is undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins are choking off 
the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the 
outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a 
vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are systemati-
cally disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a preju-
diced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby deny-
ing that minority the protection afforded other groups by a 
representative system.
Id. 
 359 Id. at 181 (“[T]he general theory is one that bounds judicial review under the 
Constitution’s open-ended provisions by insisting that it can appropriately concern 
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The Court adopted an analogous approach insofar as it values 
Congress’s role but seeks to protect the “discrete and insular minori-
ties” that Congress overlooks, which in this case are the Guantanamo 
Bay detainees.360  With the exception of Padilla, each of the Court’s 
“war on terror” decisions were decided in favor of the detainees and, 
at least theoretically and notwithstanding congressional repeal, pro-
vided some rights or protections to them: Rasul guaranteed the de-
tainees’ right to have their habeas corpus petitions heard in federal 
district courts;361 Hamdi ensured certain due process rights to citizen-
detainees seeking to challenge an “enemy-combatant” status;362 and 
Hamdan required that military commissions essentially adhere to 
those protections enumerated within the UCMJ and the Geneva Con-
ventions and, in effect, provide fair and objective hearings for alleged 
enemy combatants.363
Again, Hamdan is even more startling in its protection of indi-
vidual rights because it authoritatively extended the rights and pro-
tections of Common Article 3, along with other international law 
provisions, to the detainees.364  The breadth and impact of that deci-
sion is more pronounced by acknowledging that the Court already 
guaranteed the detainees greater protections by requiring military 
commissions to adopt the standards and procedures of courts-
marital,365 and that the Court cited to specific international law provi-
sions that are not necessarily included within U.S. jurisprudence.366  
Especially in its reliance on international law and precedents, the 
Hamdan Court has contributed to what may be perceived as a Su-
preme Court trend in which the Court invokes international law or 
exports U.S. law abroad to protect individual rights.367  Beyond Guan-
tanamo Bay, the internationalization of the Court and its concern for 
itself only with questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the 
political choice under attack.”). 
 360 This analogy is merely anecdotal and speaks to the observation that neither 
Congress nor American citizens are particularly concerned about the “enemy com-
batants,” and their rights, locked away in Guantanamo Bay.  This Comment does not 
intend to implicate constitutional doctrines, such as the Equal Protection Clause, in 
the “war on terror” cases. 
 361 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004). 
 362 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). 
 363 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2792–93 (2006). 
 364 Id. at 2794–95, 2797–98. 
 365 Id. at 2792–93. 
 366 Id. at 2797–98. 
 367 See Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 321 (2006). 
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human rights has reached issues of homosexuality,368 the death pen-
alty,369 and violations of international legal norms.370
Though it has refrained from invoking constitutional principles 
as contemplated by Ely, the Court relied upon a number of adjudica-
tory and interpretational nuances to find a way to insert itself into the 
“war on terror” and to extend the aforementioned protections to the 
detainees.  The Court narrowly construed congressionally enacted, 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions.371  It ignored or reinterpreted prece-
dent unfavorable to the detainees.372  It read statutes in favor of the 
detainees’ interests.373  It implored a balancing test to weigh citizen-
detainees’ constitutional rights.374  And, of course, most recently, the 
Court—to use the words of Carolene Products’ footnote four—asserted 
“a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”375 by requiring 
specific congressional authorization376 and enforcing the application 
of international legal standards and procedures on behalf of the de-
tainees.377
 All of these efforts positioned the Court as the most reliable—
or, at least, the most likely—protector of individual rights for the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees and other persons subject to U.S. military 
action abroad.378  While it remains Congress’s prerogative to defer to 
 368 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 369 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002). 
 370 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 371 See, e.g., Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2764–66 (interpreting DTA to allow Supreme 
Court review of military commission’s legality). 
 372 See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 476–81 (2004) (holding Guantanamo Bay 
is part of U.S. sovereign territory, and interpreting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 
(1950), Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973), and Ahrens v. 
Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), as allowing for federal judicial review of habeas corpus 
petitions in Guantanamo Bay); Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774, 2788–89 (interpreting Ex 
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) and In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), as unpersuasive 
regarding military commissions at issue); id. at 2776 n.27, 2783 (distinguishing Civil 
War precedent from current matters). 
 373 See, e.g., Hamdan, 142 S. Ct. at 2792 (holding military commissions as unlawful 
pursuant to Article 36 of the UCMJ); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478–79 (holding federal ha-
beas statute allows for federal judiciary review so long as petition is served within ju-
risdiction of petitioner’s custodian). 
 374 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 533 (2004) (holding balancing test 
from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), mandates that citizen-detainee have 
factual hearing in compliance to due process requirements). 
 375 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 376 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 377 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 378 Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 266 (2004).  
Arguing for the Supreme Court of the United States to assert itself in matters relating 
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or validate the Executive’s wishes, as it did pursuant to the Military 
Commissions Act, Congress would have been well-advised to let the 
Court, and the federal judiciary at large, remain an active and robust 
participant, and a requisite check and balance, in the “war on ter-
ror.”379  Only mutual appreciation between the Legislature and the 
Judiciary—an active Judiciary—could ensure fairness for all human 
beings plagued by terrorism, including alleged enemy combatants, and 
to guarantee the protections of law everywhere, including within “law-
less enclaves” and “legal black holes” such as Guantanamo Bay.380
VI. CONCLUSION 
Following the recent precedent of Rasul, Hamdi, and Padilla, the 
Court in Hamdan departed from a tradition of judicial deference to 
the Executive in war, military and foreign affairs, and national secu-
rity.  In so doing, the Court reviewed the “war on terror” actions of 
the Executive, specifically its implementation of military commissions 
to try alleged enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, and ultimately 
to the Executive’s actions in Guantanamo Bay, and to invoke international law—or 
“external norms”—as a means to ensure fundamental human rights, Amann writes: 
[Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),] is but the latest in which the 
Court has looked to other sources of law to assure full and fair constitu-
tional interpretation.  These external norms, not unlike many of the 
Court’s decisions in the last half-century, accord a central position to 
the human person.  Basic rights vest at birth and admit no derogation 
absent the most dire emergency.  Applied to matters like Guantanamo, 
those foundational principles require judicial abandonment of out-
dated deference doctrines that work to strip loathed individuals of 
fundamental rights. 
Id. 
 379 Id. at 319.  Amann warns: 
Far from standing as Madison’s “impenetrable bulwark” against as-
sumption of power, a court that declines [or is congressionally disal-
lowed] to enforce the Constitution [or applicable international law] at 
Guantanamo helps circumvent the constitutional separation of powers 
that protects personal liberty.  In this particular and most exceptional 
context, U.S. courts must choose the duty to protect over deference to 
the President.  Searching judicial review should examine whether the 
executive’s policy deprives individuals of basic rights and, if so, whether 
those deprivations are justified. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 380 Id. at 316.  Amann writes: 
Human rights abhor a vacuum; specifically, the relegation of human 
beings to an existence emptied of human rights protection.  External 
norms teach that when state action touches on human rights the courts 
empowered to review the validity of that state’s conduct—in this case, 
the courts of the United States—must fill the vacuum by protecting 
personal rights against government abuse. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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struck down those actions as unlawful.381  Beyond its practical implica-
tions, the significance of Hamdan, as was true for Rasul and Hamdi, is 
the Court’s assertion of a stronger separation-of-powers doctrine.  By 
requiring specific congressional authorization, the Hamdan Court jus-
tifiably forced Congress to regulate terrorism, or, more appropriately, 
to check the Executive’s handling of terrorism. 
Through the Military Commissions Act, Congress significantly 
limited the Court’s involvement in the “war on terror.”  Whatever 
may be said of the Act’s legal bases, the Act’s underlying policy seems 
misplaced.  Respect for the Court’s self-perceived and presumed roles 
in a tripartite national government and for individual rights would 
suggest that Congress’s legislative response to Hamdan, irrespective of 
its policy decisions regarding the Executive, should include a substan-
tial role for the federal judiciary.  The Court’s response to the Mili-
tary Commissions Act and the future of this tripartite battle royal are 
beyond the scope of this Comment.  The Court should continue, 
where possible, to finesse judicial oversight into matters relating to 
the “war on terror” and Guantanamo Bay.382  In the “war on terror,” 
the Court’s unprecedented contributions, inasmuch as they provide 
another check and balance upon the other two branches and ensure 
adequate room within which individual liberties may breath, are in-
valuable and irreplaceable. 
 
 381 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775, 2786, 2793 (2006). 
 382 Illustrated by its decision to hear a constitutional challenge to the Military 
Commissions Act during its 2007–2008 term, the Court seemingly agrees with this 
proposition. See Linda Greenhouse, Guantanamo Legal Battle Is Resuming: Rights of De-
tainees Will Get Third Round Before Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 2, 2007, at A14. (“In 
a surprising about-face the day after it concluded its term in June, the Supreme 
Court accepted renewed appeals on behalf of two groups of detainees and agreed to 
decide whether the [Military Commissions Act] is constitutional.”).  Reporting on 
this event, Greenhouse astutely observed the significance of the Court’s decision to 
hear this pending case when she wrote: “Now, as the parties prepare for their next 
Supreme Court confrontation later this fall, the arguments have come full circle to 
where they began: over the role of the federal courts.”  Id. 
